FOOL'S GOLD!!!

FOOL’S GOLD:

Pakistan’s nuclear assets  may allure  terrorists. However, security experts are split  on the actual threat  that is being posed.   Some of these experts assert that  Pakistan’s nuclear  assets are on the verge  of seizure  by terrorists . Other experts  contend  that such a  risk is at best, minimal. Therefore,  the real threat assessment has so far not been made . Such an assessment ought to  go  beyond merely considering putative vulnerabilities and otherwise  assumed terrorist  capability. 

Pakistan has all along been considered a potential  source of nuclear weapons, more specifically  for the covetous  terrorists . This state of affairs obtained even before Pakistan had acquired  a full-fledged  nuclear program. Not only that, this status existed  decades before we  demonstrated  a yield bearing  nuclear  explosive capability. The West was distressed  by the dissemination of nuclear technologies  and expertise to politically unstable countries. Their  military intelligence historians fore- warned  that a nuclear armed Pakistan would exponentially increase the probability of terrorist use of nuclear weapons. At present , an international chorus—well oiled and orchestrated ,   still warns  that Pakistan--- presently armed with  ~ 200 nuclear weapons is the epicenter of violent Islamism. It is suspected that   terrorist group actively seek  nuclear weapons from within this country. How real is the risk, suspicions notwithstanding ? There are two groups  of experts, who have positioned themselves  on opposite ends of the risk spectrum. These optimists and pessimists consider valid variables . However, they  fail to  evaluate  all the critical  factors. These factors include   necessary analysis   for a  methodologically robust and defensible  threat assessment, concerning  Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

The pessimists , on the other hand, contend  the risk  has grown . This group warns that  the safety  and security  of nuclear weapons  materials  in Pakistan may very well be compromised. That happenstance may occur at some point in the near future. For almost a  decade, now,   there have been calls  for US contingency  plans to take the following steps:

1-    Either destroy ,

2-    Or  temporarily secure in place ,

3-     Or exfiltrate,

Pakistani nuclear assets. Such actions should be initiated   in the event of widespread civil unrest . Or in case of  a governmental coup  that leads to an empowering of  Islamists  forces. Quite to the contrary , optimists maintain Pakistan’s nuclear weapons infrastructure is secure. They contend  the threat posed by the terrorists is overblown and exaggerated . These optimists argue that  perceptions  of vulnerability  do not adequately consider the implementation of various technical precautions. Further they politicize  advances in Pakistan’s reliability  program. Further the optimists emphasize that Pakistan maintains its nuclear arsenal  in a dissemble state. By that they imply that the nuclear weapons are  kept in  a bifurcated  manner where the weapons’ fissile  cores are  separated from the non –nuclear components. These two constituents are separate entirely from the  delivery platform. Pakistani officials maintain  that  during times  of impending or imminent  crisis , like  the 2001-2 standoff  with India, these components were never mated.  While handling  components  , or an intact weapon , Pakistan claims to abide  by two-man or three-man rules. Commensurately , a very tight  selection  for vetting personnel involved with nuclear weapons, is carried out under severe vigilance. Additionally the optimists  downplay  the threat posed by violent Islamists. They also wave off the risks associated  with the domestic  political instability. Summarily , Pakistan’s nuclear assets  are either on the brink of successful seizure by the terrorists , or they are secure. However, based on  unclassified  information , neither position is tenable. Neither  the  optimists’  nor the pessimists’  positions are defensible. In fact both positions merely  review  assumed terrorist capabilities. Separately they ascertain  putative vulnerabilities of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Unfortunately today , few assessments  consider whether  or not relevant  Pakistani  groups  are motivated  to attack  these assets. Further they fail to reach a consensus as to  what the terrorists’  operational goals  might be. It is because of  these yawning   gaps in current threat assessments  that  no definitive  determinations can be made while considering  the security  of Pakistan’s  nuclear infrastructure.

Risk assessment are comprised of two broad components : chance and consequence . The latter is not  relevant here,  apart from how the attacker’s perception  of consequence management affects his or her motivation  and method of attack.  Chance is addressed by means of a process called threat assessment  which encompasses three ingredients. The first and the second  are assessments  of the value and vulnerability of the  asset in question. The third is the likelihood of an attack  which depends on who the attackers might be , their motivations for an attack, and their perceived capabilities. In assessing the likelihood of an attack one cannot over emphasize  the importance  of the attacker’s perception  of the target’s value  and vulnerability. Figure 1 illustrates this interconnectedness with the attacker’s perception  represented by a dotted line.

There has yet been no  public indication  that terrorist groups  are interested in acquiring  nuclear weapons.  Today’s terrorists’ intentions remain largely unexplored by the nuclear security ‘s assessment experts. Erroneously , intent is essentially treated to be solely  a  derivative  of a group’s capability  and the vulnerability of the target under a would be attack.  Assuming Pakistan’s nuclear assets are at risk , we have to ascertain  what groups  might credibly threaten them? Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Neo Taliban (PNT) typically fervent the most concern . Al Qaeda , however, entirely on its own,  has not  yet conducted operationally  sophisticated attacks  within Pakistan.  Al Qaeda’s relevant attacks in Pakistan have been closely linked to , id not carried out in their entirety  by former Kashmiri fighters , foreign jihadists  and tribal militants. All the three latter groups are off shoots of the PNT.  Many analysts are firm in their belief that the Pakistan’s nuclear assets are safe from a credible Al Qaeda threat --- at least for the interim. Summarily were Al Qaeda to attack the nuclear assets, with a view to possessing them , it will depend hugely on personnel of PNT. It is therefore logical to concentrate on PNT , more specifically its largest  and most capable constituent , Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan , the TTP , meaning the movement  of the Pakistani Taliban, which forms the most credible threat. Largely an umbrella organization the TTP is composed of dozens of other mushrooming groups  and factions that do not coalesce . These factions disagree , often violently and vociferously  about tactical  and at times strategic objectives.

We are not absolutely clear about TTP’s perceived value of Pakistani nuclear assets.  However, what remains crystal clear is the TTP and is allies recognize the fact that both regional and international communities   view Pakistan’s nuclear program as a  major element   affecting the region’s geopolitical milieu. Our nuclear assets not only have tangible value –deterrence role , war fighting—it also has a symbolic value. The former value, in case of Pakistan’s nuclear assets , is determined by the outcome of a successful terrorist attack . Such an attack seizes  and removes or uses in situ nuclear weapons and materials. Contrarily , the latter value allows  for suboptimal  attack outcomes—attempts that are thwarted. Herein the asset’s value is not entirely endogenous . It also entails a symbolic slant. It often transpires that  even credible threatening  to attack a symbolic target may carry perceived benefits to the attacker. Therefore one can argue that before determining  the value of a given Pakistani nuclear asset , one must weigh how the attacker is likely to define success. An asset’s vulnerability likewise relates to two factors:

1-    Measureable  objective qualities

2-    Attacker’s perception of asset security.

In general  the decisions to attack are not influenced by the defender’s perception of the target’s vulnerability ; rather , they are reflective of  the attacker’s perception.  Concerning the target’s vulnerability,  insiders may also   be able to apprise the attacker accordingly.

A subjective equation governs the likelihood of an attack. The likelihood of an attack is calculated in part through the appreciation of a target’s perceived value  including :

1-    Instrumental ;

2-    Symbolic

as well as its vulnerability both perceived and in its actuality. A likelihood of an attack is also crucially shaped  by attacker’s intentions and/or motivations  together with his perceived innate capabilities. Intention of the attacker is partially regulated by :

1-    The attacker’s  perception of the target’s value

2-    And the target’s  vulnerability.

In addition , the attacker’s motivations are influenced  by the following three factors in the main:

1-    An ideological agenda

2-    Operational objectives and,

3-    Perceived operational  capability.

It is indeed disturbing to realize that studies in nuclear terrorism  reveal an utter disregard  for the pivotal role  of ideology  in dictating  a group’s likelihood  to secure nuclear arsenal. This is quite unfortunate , as ideology is quite likely the strongest factor in determining  why a group might choose to pursue a  policy  to secure a capability for nuclear weapons. It has been ascertained though perfunctorily that the terrorists’ ideology is the central motif. It provides the initial dynamics for the terrorists’ actions. The ideology also sets  out the moral framework  within which they operate.   A group’s ideology is extremely important because it marks the enemies of the group to be either ‘innocent’ or ‘ guilty’ ; this in turn accentuates the idea that certain people or institutions are legitimate targets.  Ideology is the behavioral driver of extremists. The terrorists may be inhibited for moral or arcane  doctrinal reasons  from carrying out attacks that are likely to cause mass casualties. Alternatively groups that possess  apocalyptic eschatology may well be drawn to secure nuclear weapons. Violent extremist  groups are absolutely convinced  that they are doing God’s bidding . They are certain that whatever action they decide to undertake  can be justified  , no matter how vicious and heinous , since the divine ends are thought to justify the means.

Additionally  a group’s  operational  objectives  area  central  element in determining an intent to attack  a given nuclear asset. There may be other goals as well , the successful seizing and spiriting away  or using in position –nuclear weapons  or fissile materials is arguably  the most likely objective of an imminent terrorists’ attack on Pakistan’s nuclear assets. While assuming that groups  are predisposed  to an assault  on Pakistan’s  nuclear infrastructure, experts  unanimously portray  such an attack to have just the objective  of successfully seizing  or using nuclear weapons or materials. That would make the attack to be largely instrumental.  In case the group’s intention is entirely symbolic , then belief in moderate operational  capabilities may be sufficient to meet the requirements of the attack. A more precise  threat assessment of Pakistan’s nuclear materials  should measure  relevant  terrorist’s  perception  of the value and the asset’s vulnerability. Terrorists’ motivation informed by ideology , operational goals and capabilities must also be critically accounted for.

Both pessimists and optimists claim an accurate  understanding  of the threats  facing Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure. Pessimists typically employ threat assessment  methodologies that infer terrorists motivation and capability while assuming  that Pakistan’s  nuclear –related  safeguards   mirror that of its other  important military assets. Optimists demonstrate flawed methodologies as well , by arguing that Pakistan’s nuclear command and control  is assertive  and consequently immune from unauthorized usage. These optimists , quite foolhardy , as they are assert that Pakistan’s military  is largely free  from militant threat . They offer largely artificial and static assessments and may be cut off from recent realities.

Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure, as it is, is alarmingly insecure . The concerning threat assessment is typically  emphasized by three supporting factors:

1-    Observers generally believe that a  variety of militants operating in Pakistan , notably the TTP  are motivated  to acquire nuclear  capability. Although the militants  have not made any statements  of nuclear intent, experts  often point to declarations linked to Al Qaeda  specifically the May 2003 fatwa delivered by Saudi  Shaykh Nasir ibn Hamid  al Fahd  allowing the use  of chemical , biological  and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Since, at least 1994 , certain jihadist groups , conflated with the TTP , have expressed  motivation  to acquire  CBRN weapons . Since 2003 , such desires and covetousness  have been linked  by some religious authorities.

2-    Pessimists argue  the TTP is not only motivated  but also increasingly capable  of acquiring  a nuclear weapon. According to experts , the operational sophistication  of some attacks  --specifically the October 2009 TTP assault  on the Pakistan Army GHQ in Rawalpindi  reflect modalities  that add up to a virtual blue print  for a successful  attack on a nuclear weapons facility.

3-    Pessimist commentators warn  that critical elements of Pakistan’s  nuclear infrastructure are vulnerable  to certain types of terrorists attacks. Perceived insecurities are usually inferred from the following factors:

(a)  It is assumed that with a proliferation of nuclear weapons  and their dispersal  at an increasing number of sites , the security challenges  are ever growing in this country. The qualitative evolution of its arsenal is a further concern including warhead miniaturization  which allow for war heads that easier to seize and transport.

(b) Pakistan’s determination to expand its arsenal , suggests it may be augmenting its nuclear posture  to include asymmetrical escalation . By expanding the delivery system for a  pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons  against Indian forces within its borders, Pakistan needs to disperse warheads . A pre-delegation of these war heads outside of the central command,  would allow local commanders to use nuclear weapons  technically called a “ peripheral launch capability.”  With terrorists  operating in a pre-delegative environment , they would have better chances of seizing and whisking away nuclear weapons not strictly under centralized state control.

(c)  With the growth of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure  more people have access to sensitive material, data , codes  and information: there are Trojan Horses within the nuclear network and an insider collusion  can never be discounted more so  after the May 2011 attack on Mehran naval aviation base—and there is every likelihood of a similar invasion of nuclear weapons facility.

Summarizing , pessimists assert that groups like the TTP have the motivation, capability , and , because of vulnerabilities , the opportunity  to successfully seize or use in situ  Pakistani nuclear assets. However, pessimists’ risk assessment is entirely inference based.

Now to the Optimists and their risk assessment which again is based on inference.

Interestingly , experts both pessimists and optimists have a consensus in two key regards:

1-    They accept  that violent  Islamists  are motivated  to acquire Pakistani nuclear assets;

2-    Both agree that TTP is displaying  a growing capability to conduct  sophisticated  operations.

Concerning perceived  asset vulnerabilities, is where these Experts  differ.

Regarding pre-delegation , optimists  counter the pessimists’ stance by stating that Pakistan  likely maintains  a centralized  nuclear command  for three reasons in the main:

1-    Pakistan’s internal unrest requires  close arsenal guardian ship  and stringent measures to prevent a seizure of nuclear weapon components  and accidental or unauthorized detonation.

2-    Pakistan must placate US nuclear command and control concerns to maintain an influx of generous uninterrupted  aid.

3-    Pakistan must  show India  that its arsenal is  stable in  both peacetime  and crisis  to obviate a possibility of “ preventative” conventional or nuclear strike.

Optimists, though acknowledging  the presence of militants  within the military , argue that the possibility of an Islamist-led military coup  and consequent possession of nuclear weapons by terrorists, is extremely remote. In case Islamists do indeed seize power, optimists maintain  that they would not seek to change  Pakistan’s foreign policy –a behavior that would occlude nuclear collaboration with the militants. With regard to insider collusion , attempts at seizure would fail  as the rogue elements would have to fight their way through several layers  of highly motivated  personnel  who are armed to their teeth.

Much as I have argued earlier , Pakistan’s  nuclear posture  is changing intoa  configuration  that ebraces war fighting  and pre-delegation.  Centralized  control of nuclear weapons  is likely to be partial at best , especially during times of turmoil.  After almost a decade of civil war now culminating in  Zarb- e Azb, Pakistan ‘s military is beginning to show signs  of renewed  terrorist collusion , this time with groups  that actively oppose  the United States and other Western Powers. As of today Imran Khan is leading a lock up in Lahore. Political instability is very much in the offing. The difference between the have and the have nots , is a gaping hole ever yawning.  Every day is a burden . The Herods could not care less. The Conspiracy in the Corridors is ringing a death knell for the Rulers. A void at the top will not take too long in forming. That void will have to be filled up . The militants will do so in collusion with the Army. The nuclear weapon which took this country several decades to achieve ; so many lives were lost in the struggle ; the Man who was prepared to eat grass but make Pakistan nuclear was hung. All the effort , painstaking and sedulous as it was, may all turn out to be in vain ---the glory short-timed may after all have been a  vain glory.  The Grand Detonation that turned the Chaghai  Hill in Baluchistan, entirely black  ---may implode  and destroy the very fabric of this country. The Gold we all tried to mine in the Chaghai Hills may turn out to be Fool’s Gold at the end of the day!! .    

        

                        

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Posted in Chaghai!!, collusion, experts, Fool's Gold, militants, optimists, Pakistan's nuclear assets, pessimists, Risk assessment, TTP

EPILOGUE

EPILOGUE:

Pakistan possesses close to two hundred nuclear weapons , while its search for security continues. In 2011, several major events rocked the state of Pakistan , raising a litany of concerns: a crisis of national identity between moderates and conservatives ; the fate of its fledgling democracy ; and the future of US-Pakistan relations. The internal and external struggles continue to mount. The year 2011 began with the brutal assassinations of Punjab’s liberal governor Salman Taseer, on January 4, 2011, and a few months later of Christian minority minister Shahbaz in Islamabad , incited by Islamic fundamentalism that saw that state under the fear of reprisals. As a result , these incidents sparked an internal debate about the fate of the country.1 That same month , CIA contractor Raymond Davis killed two Pakistani citizens in Lahore ,triggering unprecedented anger among the Pakistanis . This issue was eventually resolved after blood money was paid to the family of the victims , but it triggered a level of distrust among allies in the war on terrorism.

On May 2, 2011 , in a spectacular raid deep into Pakistan in the city of Abbot bad , U.S. Navy SEALs killed Osama bin Laden. No incident in recent history was as sensational and shocking. The Abbot bad operation created intense controversy in the country , since it was viewed as a breach of Pakistan’s sovereignty.2 This was followed by official statements by U.S. government officials alleging complacency or complicity of the Pakistani security forces.3 Then came the November 26,2011 , attack led by U.S. forces on the Pakistani Army check-post at Salala on the border with Afghanistan , which killed twenty seven soldiers and officers; it proved to be the proverbial “ straw that broke the camel’s back” and brought U.S. –Pak relations to an all time low.

These military operations punctured the balloon of uncertainty and mistrust that had progressively matured over the decade since Pakistan joined the war against terrorism in the aftermath of September 11, 2011. The combination of these factors has served to aggravate the anti-American sentiment within the country , which is enhanced by conspiracy theorist s and right wingers on both sides .

Pakistan ‘s National Engineering and Scientific Commission ( NESCOM) has developed the Burraq Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) , which in future can be armed like a Predator with increased range, giving it the capabilities of an unmanned combat aerial vehicle or a cruise missile. Its current range stands at 1250 km , which can provide enhanced coast to coast capability one way.

In South Asia there are clear trajectories in nuclear trend-lines indicating new security doctrines , force modernizations, and technological innovations that are leading the region into a nuclear arms race. An end to the rivalry with India, stabilization of Afghanistan , and resolving the variety of domestic issues would be an ultimate gain for the whole region, especially it opens up the trade and energy corridors between Central Asia and South Asia.

Specifically , in the case of Pakistan , achieving balance in conventional force numbers and modernization , in tandem with progress in bilateral relations with India, is the key to lowering numbers of nuclear weapons. Pakistan ‘s political stability is still uncertain , and the future of strategic stability in the light of these developments and modernizations is still not assured. Undoubtedly , the coming decade will be one of continued strain and skepticism . A continued dialogue and understanding of the nuclear environment and security doctrines in the region are necessary to keep any conflict at bay.

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Posted in 2011, blood money, Burraq, NESCOM, OBL, Raymond Davis, Salman Taseer, Shahbaz, UAV

NUCLEAR PAKISTAN AND THE REST OF THE WORLD!!!

NUCLEAR PAKISTAN AND THE WORLD:

Pakistan has suffered  multiple shocks  in the ten years  since the A.Q. Khan  network exposure.  The strategic  landscape  has drastically changed , and the domestic situation  is especially worrisome. Terrorists and violent extremism  threaten to impose  their will  by continuous  challenge  to state authority.  After years of fighting  in Afghanistan , the prospects  for stability and peace  appear dim. The United States  has increased  counter-terror strikes  against suspected  militants strongholds  in the tribal  borderlands , and Pakistan’s armed forces are spread thin  assisting these missions.  Meanwhile,  hundreds of suicide attacks  have targeted  Pakistani hotels , marketplaces , Sufi shrines , government offices , and military head quarters.  As political  forces struggle  for power  and influence , sectarian  and ethnic conflicts  span the whole country ---most notably  in Karachi and Baluchistan . The ensuing political instability  and plummeting  economy  are eating the state from within , even while the country  steadily  progresses  towards its strategic weapons force goals.

Having survived more than four decades  of trials and tribulations , the nuclear program has been  fueled  by  a strategic  culture  filled  with historic  grievances , military  defeats  , and paranoia. Pakistan  has  procured,  built , secured , and managed one of the most advanced  technologies  in the world  and has good reason  to be proud of its capability.  There is almost no other  comparable achievement in the country’s history. Today  the armed forces  and the civilian  bureaucracy , from the religious  right to the liberal left , all support  Pakistan’s  continued nuclear weapons  capability .  The nuclear  factor  is so deeply  embedded  in national security thinking  that any step  toward disarmament  would  be met  with stiff resistance. Moreover , there is  a strong  consensus  that Pakistan’s  nuclear  weapons  are under a  constant threat  from hostile countries , which include the United States , Israel and India. Pakistanis believe  that their  nuclear arsenal  remains vulnerable  to preventive  or preemptive attacks, and thus  even a  rumor  of attack prompts the armed forces to take precautionary measures. ¹

Undoubtedly , the people of Pakistan  have paid  a heavy  price , and many of their economic  woes  are the consequences  of national security  decisions  taken  since 1972. Indeed, preserving  the nuclear capability  has been the cornerstone of many leaders’  decision –making processes. To attain  the nuclear capability  was an end in itself  and any means  were justified  , including  forcing a people to eat grass  in sacrifice. So how will Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal  impact the country’s future trajectory?

Proliferation pessimists worry that a  nuclear Pakistan  will encourage other  states to follow suit  and increases the likelihood  of nuclear weapons  use in South Asia . Still others believe  that nuclear weapons have actually exacerbated regional  security problems  and caused crises, and still others worry about terrorists acquiring  the weapons or materials . ²  Optimists  credit  the absence of wars and contained  military crises  to a nuclear  weapons  arsenal. ³ These same positive-minded  individuals  point out  that there has been  no major breach  either of safety or of nuclear  security  in the country. ⁴ After all , Pakistan cooperated with the international  community  to shut down  the A.Q. Khan network  and to improve its command  and control  over weapons and materials. ⁵

Nevertheless, Pakistan ‘s biggest  challenge to its deterrent  has nothing to do with fissile material  stocks , delivery  means , or an ambiguous  nuclear doctrine , but rather rests on future internal threats. For Pakistan to maintain  a strategic balance  and avoid increased conflict  with India , it must uphold social cohesion , government  stability , and sustained  economic  growth.⁶

The Role of Nuclear Weapons: The Pakistanis see no role  for nuclear weapons  other than to deter India  from waging a conventional war. This was the original purpose for the program , and it stands to this day --- notwithstanding the fact  that Pakistan is vulnerable  to an Indian attack  because it is internally weak and divided. This situation poses a paradox because nuclear deterrence  can work  effectively  only if other vulnerabilities and weaknesses  do not exist. Vulnerabilities  are tempting  and challenge the credibility  of deterrence . In fact, India’s  basic premise  to wage a  limited  war against Pakistan  is to punish the country  in response to what it calls state-sponsored-terrorism or threats that are hatched  and waged from the Pakistani soil  with or without  the connivance  of the state or its entities . Pakistan dismisses this rationale and argues  that Pakistan has suffered more  from violent extremists and spillover  of Afghan instability , and that India is simply using the  post 9/11  environment to wage a  war  against its long term adversary. Should India wage a limited war  and succeed  in terminating  it on its terms , deterrence will have failed. From the Pakistani perspective , to enhance the credibility, it is  forced to risk  the use of nuclear weapons  simply  to stop  India  in its tracks.  However, the bottom line is that nuclear weapons  alone  cannot  constitute  an effective  national security  if other elements  of national power remain dangerously weak.

Emerging Force Goals: Even though the  purpose of nuclear weapons  is clear, Pakistan is still in the early stages  of nuclear learning . The Kargil episode demonstrated  that Pakistani strategic  thinking  was dominated  by conventional  military  logic. In 2002 crisis , the ambiguity  of its nuclear use  doctrine  was scrutinized , and its nuclear deterrent was tested. As head of state , Musharraf  demonstrated  his statesman like qualities  by adopting  a pragmatic response  to international scrutiny and to military crisis with India. And when the A.Q. Khan crisis  struck , he carefully  balanced  domestic  and international concerns.  For Pakistan , these experiences were in first steps along a  steep learning  curve in an increasingly complex world.⁷ Decades of experience  in nuclear diplomacy  are useful  but not sufficient  for the self-declared  nuclear power  to tackle the nuances  of international relations.

The purpose of possessing nuclear weapons  for deterrence  against  a conventional attack  was established , but what constitutes  deterrence  success or failure  was not easy to determine. The knowledge  that a  bomb exists  in the basement  was not sufficient  for India  to give up plans for fighting  and winning a conventional war.  Furthermore Pakistanis recognize  that deterrence works primarily in the eye of the beholder , and as a political weapon , nuclear weapons can be credible only once they are perceived  as militarily usable.  For over a  decade now, after three major crises, Pakistan’s  National Command Authority  has matured in formulating  strategic  doctrines , thresholds, targeting , and survivability plans.

Pakistan ‘s delivery means  were expanded  and diversified , including  in the arena  of cruise  missiles,  which have recently been tested.  The auxiliary  assertions  about the role  of nuclear weapons , however, are still in flux.  Until the end of the first decade  after the nuclear tests , there has been little  focus on influential factors  such as the  political status of becoming a nuclear power , especially in terms  of regional  and international affairs. That might change in the coming decade , especially after India  is conferred  with special status  in the nuclear world order  and Pakistan is made an outlier.

A Nuclear Pakistan : tale of Two Futures: What role  nuclear weapons  will likely play  in Pakistani policies and in its regional  and international  engagements will depend  primarily on four developments : 1- how the war on terrorism  proceeds  and what role  Pakistan will play in it; 2- how regional  dynamics  affect conflict resolution and regional power balance  between India and Pakistan; 3-  How the United States  acts in Asia and toward the Islamic world particularly Iran; 4- how Pakistan’s  own domestic  politics progress  under, or after,  military rule. Depending on these developments , Pakistan’s nuclear policy is likely  to evolve  into one or two futures.

The first future is moderate  and pragmatic  and would occur  if Pakistan has  a  moderate government  that ensures  balanced  civil-military relations . This course  would perpetuate  the national security  establishment’s  perception of nuclear force  as purely  a national security  instrument.  Even with the changing regional dynamics , it will likely follow  the predictable pattern  that has been  seen in the past . Pakistan  would continue to rely  on a  combination  of internal and external  balancing techniques to meet emerging threats. Pakistani nuclear and conventional  forces would grown in tandem  with India’s  force modernization .  Its external balancing would likely rely  on China , Muslim countries , and the United States . If Pakistan ‘s economy grows  and if relations  with India  improve,  the probability  of Cold War –style nuclear learning , to include arms control  and confidence building  measures with India , should not be ruled out.

The other nuclear future  is a  radical shift  away from Pakistan’s  traditional  approach  to international  relations.  Such an outcome  is more likely  if a radical  right-wing government  assumes power.  A domestic change of this nature  could shift  the emphasis  of nuclear weapons  from a  purely national security  tool to a more ideologically  based power instrument . This would result in confrontation , most likely  with Pakistan’s  non –Muslim neighbor  and the West , and perhaps  extended deterrence  to the Muslim world. This scenario is plausible since right-wing political parties  have hinted  to this effect. However, this future  would complicate  Pakistan’s relationship with  the world  and could put  the country’s nuclear program  into jeopardy.

In sum , Pakistan’s  decades-old struggle to improve  its precarious  security  predicament  has provided security  from its principal adversary –India.  However, as Pakistan  becomes  an advanced  nuclear state , it faces asymmetric  threats to its security  that require different  instruments  of conventional  force backed  up with political , diplomatic , and economic efforts.

In the summer of 2010, the Pakistani nation  was devastated  by one  of the worst  recorded  floods in history . Nearly one third of the country was submerged  under raging waters  , and nearly two thirds of its prime crops and livestock  were destroyed,  displacing  nearly 25 million  people . Meanwhile , a double digit inflation,  poor growth , unemployment , and massive corruption  have brought  the country  into a state of “ stagflation” . As the military  balances  multiple contingencies  and its nuclear arsenal  continues to grow  and mature into a deterrent force  ,  the Pakistani  masses seem destined  to” eat grass------ even go hungry”. Perhaps it never crossed  Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto ‘s mind that his words  would become a self-fulfilling prophecy. 

Dr .I.R. Durrani

The references embedded in the text will be provided later!! 

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Posted in " Eating Grass", A.Q. Khan, Iran, Nuclear Doctrine, Pakistan--India Conflict, the rest of the world, West, ZAB

Empowering Climate Change Strategies using Bernard Lonergan's Method!! !

http://www.amazon.com/Empowering-Climate-Change-Strategies-Bernard-Lonergans/dp/0761865128

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Posted in Bernard lonergan, Climate Change Strategies, joint authorship John Raymaker & Ijaz Durrani

PAKISTAN'S MISSILE QUEST

PAKISTAN’S MISSILE QUEST

Although ballistic missiles today are the mainstay of Pakistan’s nuclear delivery system, the acquisition , development , flight-testing, and introduction of ballistic missiles  into Pakistani  strategic  arsenals  was as arduous a process as was the development of the nuclear program a decade earlier. As in the case of its approach to the nuclear program , Pakistan initially avoided  investing in rockets , ballistic missiles , or a space program  when there existed an opportunity to acquire  technology  through cooperation. Then a series  of military crises in the mid-1980s and the successful  Indian Prithvi  and Agni  missile tests spurred the development  of a modest  Pakistani  rocket program. However, it was the summer  1990  military crises  and subsequent  shock  of the U.S.  nuclear sanctions  in the same year that propelled  missile technology  acquisition into full speed.

When Pakistan attempted to respond  to India’s  series of missile –flight  tests in 1988 and 1989, the West provided the same advice  to Islamabad  that it had regarding the nuclear program: India’s acquisitions  should be ignored  and Pakistan  should  take up the moral  high ground  and adhere to nonproliferation  norms. As before, dependence on economic  and military aid made Pakistan  more vulnerable  to Western coercion. The United States  virtually  abandoned the region , imposed  nuclear sanctions, and refused  to supply Pakistan  with more F-16s—Pakistan’s primary  delivery vehicle for nuclear warheads. So the more that the West, specifically the United States, pressured Pakistan  to exercise restraint , the more its resolve grew to match India’s strategic force. Once again , Islamabad  perceived  India’s treatment as preferential , and Pakistan’s as punishment  for redressing  its security concerns.

Indeed, Pakistan ‘s strategic culture is the best explanation  for its near panic to meet the new challenges posed by its chief adversary . As nationalism  gripped  the isolated country  , missile scientists  and technicians found a  new sense  of pride  and motivation  in their tasks . Finding no prospects for cooperation in Europe in the 1990s , Pakistan  again looked  to its strategic  ally China and willing suppliers in the Far East.  Predictably,  another  familiar  pattern would emerge ---inter-laboratory rivalry between the Pakistan atomic Energy Commission( PAEC) and Khan Research Laboratory ( KRL)  , this time to master  solid fuel  and liquid  fuel  technologies for missiles.

Initial Pakistani Missile Development:  In the early 1980s , the arrival  of F-16 jet fighter  aircraft  from the United States  provided  Pakistan  with an operationally  reliable  method  of delivery  for its nascent  nuclear arsenal. Cold tests  that included  bomb-delivery  simulations relied upon these aircraft  and Mirage—V attack  aircraft from France. Pakistan’s long reliance  on U.S. assistance  forced  the leadership  to offer a freeze  of its nuclear program  in return  for renewed  military cooperation . In response , the United States  made new demands : to destroy  the existing  nuclear cores  and to “ roll –back its capability  to the other side of the line.”¹  Clearly , a few F-16s  were not worth sacrificing  the nuclear program , so, after absorbing  the disbelief  and shock, Pakistan began to consider an alternative delivery system . The United States had overestimated its leverage  and inadvertently  fueled  the Pakistani missile program . From that point on , missile development  joined weapons at the top rung of Pakistan’s  national  security priorities.

Throughout the 1960s  and 1970s  both Pakistan and India  had developed  some basic rocketry  and space –launch  technologies  through their civilian  space programs , ²  but it was not until  the latter  began its Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP) in 1983 that the missile race began in earnest. ³

Space and Upper Atmosphere  Research Commission ( SUPARCO) established in 1961 was originally  in the Space Sciences Research Wing  of the PAEC before it became a separate organization in 1964. These entities collaborated  with the U.S.  National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in June 1962 to launch Pakistani research “ sounding rockets” Rehbar—I  and Rehbar—II . Pakistan’s eventual capability  to develop  a ballistic missile  program  derived  from the knowledge  its scientists obtained through its  cooperation  with NASA on sounding rockets. ⁴

Solid –Motor Hatfs: Aside from a few inaccurate  ballistic missiles and Soviet Scuds  that were fired into Pakistani  tribal areas  from Afghanistan , Pakistan  had very little with which to start  a missile program. ⁵ SUPARCO with the assistance of KRL , a team  hastily combined  various  available  technologies  to produce  the first surface—to—surface  missiles , dubbed Hatf I and Hatf II . The Hatf I is a single  -stage solid motor  , battlefield range  missile capable  of delivering  a five hundred-kg payload  over a  maximum  range  of eighty to one hundred km.  Hatf II  was a modified version of Hatf –I  and is composed of a second stage  and a new  boost motor  added to the first stage –still a short range missile  but with increased reach  and payload capabilities. In response  to India’s  demonstration of the Prithvi  ballistic missile , in February 1989 Pakistan tested  the two Hatf  missiles  and declared the tests a success.  In May 2002 , at the peak of the crises with India , the Hatf II /Abdali was flight tested  along with other categories  of missiles and later was finally inducted  into the army’s strategic force command.

Strategic Missile Cooperation : China: Islamabad’s logical  option  was to turn  to its long –time strategic ally , China, for help. Conveniently , China  was not a member  of the MTCR at the time  and was opposed  on principle  to export control cartels.

Ghaznavi ( Hatf—III) : U.S. Sources  believe that initial  transfers  of some thirty assembled M-11 missiles  were made to Pakistan  in 1992. The Chinese transfer of M-11 technology  was only  for high-explosive warheads.  Having undergone the design modifications, a new missile named Ghaznavi  could carry a five-hundred-kg payload , sufficient  for a second –generation  nuclear warhead , but not suitable for Pakistan’s heavier  first-generation  weapons. The missile has an inertial  guidance system  and uses jet vanes in the nozzle to make  trajectory  corrections  during the boost  phase. Over the next three years  further technical  improvements  were made  to the heat  shielding  areas, and after several tests  a new batch  of Ghaznavi  missiles  were inducted  into the Army Strategic Forces Command( ASAF) in April 2007. Finally , February 2008 marked  the successful  flight test  of this missile by ASAF.

Shaheen: Hatf IV and VI : The missile  designated  as Shaheen –I ( Hatf –IV) was first publicly displayed  at the National day Parade in march 1999 and then under went several  flight tests thereafter.  The Shaheen –I is a single stage , solid fueled  , road mobile , short-range  ballistic missile  with  a maximum range of  seven hundred km and able to deliver a five-hundred  -kg payload. In January 2008, a flight test of Shaheen-  I was conducted  successfully  and the missile is currently operational.   

 Shaheen – II/  Hatf ---VI: The Shaheen II was first displayed  during  an October 2003, national day Parade . The first  flight test  of the twenty-five-ton  Shaheen –II  occurred  in march 2004  at the Somiani  Flight Test Range  on the Arabian  Sea  and was claimed  to have  covered  1880 km . Shaheen II  underwent four more tests  , in march 2005,  April 2006, February 2007, and April 2008. The last test was conducted  by ASAF , an indication  that it was inducted into the army arsenal.  It may be added here that the solid propellants used in the M-series missiles  have a finite  shelf life. After that time safety  and reliability  are increasingly  compromised. Hence Pakistan went on the lookout for Liquid Fuel.

WHY Liquid Fuel? : Pakistan developed  a strategic connection  with the unpopular  North Korea regime, which was selling untested  and relatively  unattractive  technologies , in an attempt to acquire  a liquid fuel platform.  Why would  Pakistan  want a  liquid  fueled  missile  when it had  access  to solid fuel  from China?  After all,  Islamabad was  already  under nuclear sanctions, making  this acquisition  a political risk that could  alienate  Japan and United States.

  Three rationales  might explain why  this choice was made. First , the range –payload  characteristics  of the solid propellant  systems  from China  limited Pakistan’s  ability to deliver  a nuclear weapon  to the heart of Indian territory. The North Korean  Nodong missile  has a larger  maximum  payload  capacity  ( 700 to 1000 kg ) and can cover  more territory  ( one thousand  to thirteen hundred km).  Moreover, the liquid  fuel technology  from North Korea  was offered  at inexpensive  rates, as both  the buyer  and seller  were poor countries  with high-premium  national security  requirements  and economic exigencies.  Second, inter-institutional  rivalries  between the PAEC and the KRL  prompted  the latter to seek and independent channel for missile acquisition. The two institutions  had a  history  of competition  throughout the nuclear weapons program , and it seemed only  logical  that the rivalry  would extend to missile delivery system. ⁶  Finally both  north Korea  and Pakistan  were desperate  : Pyongyang needed another party willing  to test the Nodong  technology  , as the North Korean  geography did not permit  frequent tests, and Pakistan  knew that their supply  routes would be cut off sooner or later. The fear of rejection  was not restricted to the West, but extended even to China. The decision to cooperate with Pyongyang  resulted in a  competition  between  China  and North Korea, as the  former discouraged Pakistan  from closely  cooperating with Pyongyang . Islamabad’s  dealings  with the pariah state  could have dragged  China  into controversy . more important,  Beijing  enjoyed the market  monopoly  it held  with regard  to missile  technology  transfers to Pakistan.

North Korea and KRL: As early as June 1992 , representatives  from KRL  and government  officials from key agencies  visited the Sanum –dong guided  missile development  centre in North Korea  to examine the  Nodong. The  Nodong  technology is based  on a  Soviet missile system  speculated  to be “ an upscale  version  of the Soviet R-17 missile.⁷   The missile’s basic  airframe  is made from steel  , while other  sections  are made from aluminum. The propulsion  system is a liquid –fueled engine  that uses  a  combination  of inhibited red  fuming nitric acid and kerosene. During the boost phase,  four jet vanes  are used  for thrust  vector control , and the missile  is also believed  to use three body –mounted  gyros  for altitude  and lateral acceleration  control. With a payload  of 700 to 1300 kg , the Nodong  is capable of carrying both high explosive  conventional  and nuclear warheads. ⁸

The deal was cemented in late 1995 and the missiles were delivered in the fall of 1997. Just as the Chinese  had established  a turnkey  facility for the M series  solid fuel missile, North Korea  undertook a parallel  effort for the liquid fuel missiles.

Ghauri/ Hatf –V:  The Ghauri ( Hatf—V) is a single –stage , liquid propelled  missile capable of delivering  a 700  to 1300 kg payload  an estimated  eight hundred  to fifteen hundred  km. It was first tested in Pakistan in April 1998. Two additional  test flights  were conducted , in April 1999 and May 2002; since then  Pakistan has conducted  several flight tests  of Ghauri-I  : in April 1999, May 2002, may 2004, June 2004, October 2004 and November 2006. ⁹ In February 2008, the Strategic Missile Group (SMG) of the ASAF  tested Ghauri as part of an exercise , indicating  operational deployment.

Ghuri II and III: Improvements , reverse engineering  , and synergizing  expertise  from various  strategic organizations allowed  the Ghauri project  to continue into  Ghauri II and III  missiles whose ranges  were intended to reach  more deeply into India. Pakistan ‘s long term  plans  are classified  , but from it is evident that ballistic missiles  will remain the mainstay  of the arsenal  and the technicians  will focus  on improving  ranges  and accuracy , as well as the reentry, telemetries , and guidance  systems.

Quid Pro Quo or Money?  In February 2004, Pakistan admitted  publicly  that the missile technology  from North Korea  had been obtained  with cash. ¹⁰ The United imposed sanctions  on KRL and North Korea’s Chaggwang Sinyong Corporation in  March 2003  for engaging in proliferation  activities. ¹¹

Cruise Missiles:

Babur/ Hatf –VII : Islamabad came under  further pressure  to respond  when India’s  cooperative program  with Russia  on the development  of the Brahmos supersonic  cruise missile began . In August 2005, Pakistan  conducted the first test  of its Babur ( Hatf –VII) cruise missile . Babar is a subsonic missile  that can carry  both nuclear  and conventional payloads  and has a range of  seven hundred km , although its range after the test  was five hundred  km. It  is a  terrain hugging  missile,  making detection  by ground based  radars  difficult. ¹² Pakistan maintains  that its cruise  missile technology  was developed  indigenously , but U.S. experts suspect  that Babar is based on the Chinese  DH-10 missile.

Ra’ad/ Hatf –VII: In April 2011, Pakistan  introduced a new weapons system . A short-range  surface—to –surface , two tube  rocket launcher , believed to be a Chinese-design  multiple  rocket launcher , is mounted  on an eight  --wheeler  transporter  erector  launcher  carrying a  20 –foot ballistic missile  with a diameter  of about 3000 mm. The system is stated to be capable  of carrying  either conventional  or nuclear  warheads . The debate rages  on at  this time whether such a  system will have a  deterrence  effect in the battlefield or otherwise. Regardless , the introduction  of such a  battlefield nuclear weapon system  will pose three major challenges  affecting stability.  First, its  short range  would warrant  its deployment close  to Pakistan ‘s own troops , close to the border , which will increase field security issues;  second,  the command  and control  of such a system  will be very complicated , bringing into question  whether to retain  central  control or delegate  it to field  formations for greater  battle  effectiveness; and lastly , such a  battle system with its peculiar signals  will likely induce  preemptive  pressures  on India  or any other adversary  to attack  with conventional  weapons, thus triggering  a premature  or even unintended war. ¹³ 

Missile Deployments and Strategic Impact: Pakistan ‘s missile force  satisfy most of the country ‘s strategic needs , at least  those that relate to India.  And since Pakistan  does not currently  have large  regional aspirations  or other threatening  adversaries  , developing  intercontinental  missiles will not be a priority  for Islamabad. Rather , increasing  its self sufficiency  in the area  of short –and medium range missile development  and production  will very likely  be the focus of Pakistan’s future activities.

Dr. I.R. Durrani

PS: The references embedded in the text will be provided later!! 

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Posted in A Q Khan, KRL, Missiles, PAEC, PRC, Proliferation, Reverse Engineering

PROCUREMENT NETWORK IN THE GREY MARKET

Procurement  Network in the Grey Market:

Western accounts  of Pakistan’s  procurement  strategy  focus exclusively  on A.Q. Khan , whose role is cast  either as  spy or kingpin of an elaborate network  that ran like a nuclear Wal- Mart. ¹  For A.Q. Khan  and others  who were involved  in procurement activities, however, acquiring  the necessary  knowledge and components  for the nuclear program  was a   call  to the highest level  of national service  at a time  when Pakistan’s  security  and survivability  were at stake. Dedicated  people  who were determined to overcome  all technical  and political  hurdles placed before the Pakistan  nuclear program  were prepared not just to “ eat grass”  but also to take extraordinary  risks—at times with their lives –in the underworld  of nuclear procurement , all in the name  of technology  and national capacity.

Three significant factors handicapped Pakistan  and created the necessity for a procurement network.  First, no other  country  with similar  nuclear  ambitions  faced  such  stringent  non proliferation barriers. Contemporary  proliferators  such as Brazil , Argentina, South Africa, India , and Israel  had crossed the critical thresholds well before  the non proliferation regime tightened its screw.  From Pakistan’s perspective , however , its exclusion  was not  just  a matter  of timing—Pakistan  believed it was targeted  because  it was the only Muslim country acquiring such weapons at the time. Many other states  in the Islamic world  were gradually  convinced  of this belief as well.  Saudi Arabia , Libya , the UAE, and, to an extent , Iran ( under shah) were determined  not to let the Pakistani nuclear ship sink. 

Second , Pakistan  was extremely  vulnerable and did not have any leverage of its own.  Beset with huge economic burdens , domestic political  unrest, and regional  security  concerns, it was largely dependent  on international  institutions and aid. Although Pakistan  was aware  that Western countries  were not sympathetic  so its security anxieties , it knew that its alliance with the West was critical  and largely unavoidable . Islamabad  could afford  neither  confronting  not abandoning the West.

Instead , Pakistan  sought more reliable strategic  relationships  via alliances with China  and North Korea. A three –pronged strategic policy  surface :1- retain an alliance wit the West  and seek technological  assistance , 2- seek financial  support  from oil-rich  Islamic countries to sustain the economy , and 3- seek strategic  substitutes  with assured allies  when Western technology  was not available.

The third and most serious handicap  was the rapid deterioration of the regional  security situation.  The dramatic  alteration  of the geopolitical  landscape—especially  after the Islamic  Revolution  in Iran  and the Soviet union’s  invasion  of Afghanistan ---created a new strategic  environment  for which Pakistan had no preparation . Pakistan armed forces  faced potential aggressor  on two fronts . Although the country enjoyed  the benefits  of being  a frontline  state  as long as the Soviets lasted in Afghanistan , the socioeconomic  and security  costs were substantial  and the resulting anarchy in the region  still threaten Islamabad today.

It was under such circumstances  that the lack  of Western non proliferation  concerns opened  up a new window  of opportunity  for Pakistan’s  nuclear deterrent. The technical  hurdles  forced  scientists  and officials  to tap  into any  and every source  that would help Pakistan  complete its fuel cycle.  Where  rules were lax,  critical  supplies  were produced  from the West , and when non proliferation barriers increased , those supplies  were found  by other , less explicit means. It is important to remember  that while uranium enrichment  became  a top priority , plutonium  production  still continued , but at a slower pace.  Thus Pakistan officials searched for materials that met the needs of both ends of the nuclear fuel cycle.      

Tom and Jerry in the Open Market: When pressure mounted  on France  and other European countries  to scuttle the Pakistani nuclear  program , a cat and mouse  game  ensued  between the European suppliers and Pakistani demands , as Pakistani  buyers  raced to acquire  goods, dodging  obstacles  and slipping away. This became possible because  the Western bureaucracies  were slow to act . A.Q. Khan  and his suppliers  stayed one step  ahead of their pursuers  for almost three decades.

Initially , Pakistan  participated  in purchases  of key components  from the open market. As rules tightened , however, willing  suppliers  shifted to the grey market. Most published  Western accounts  blame either U.S. policy—makers or intelligence agencies for turning a Nelson’s eye  on Pakistani procurements. Perhaps the United States  might have barred  critical  supplies  to Pakistan early on , but the exigencies  of global security  trumped  nonproliferation  concerns.

The Pakistani approach  was innovative . Although  initially pursuing  entire machines  and technologies, Pakistan  eventually  began to acquire components  of enrichment  technology  and equipment  from small-high technology  Western firms. Once the individual  components ---from the yellow cake , to gasification /solidification units , to centrifuge parts—found their way to Pakistan , PAEC scientists and engineers  would assemble them to achieve mastery over the enrichment cycle.

As a counterpart  to A.Q. Khan’s efforts , another  significant  cross –section  of Pakistan’s network  was at play: Europe’s business community , which found ingenious ways of keeping the Pakistan procurement pipeline flowing. At first , all activities  were conducted  within legal bounds , but when laws changed and rules tightened , the supply  patterns  adjusted  accordingly  and grey areas of legal  interpretation emerged. But Pakistan  did not purposefully  design a  network . rather , it was a  product  of intense  domestic demand  and of Western  business interests. Willing suppliers  were looking for profits  ---some unwittingly  contributing  to the establishment of a network , others  with full knowledge of their product’s  end use.  Indeed , many business people  had no regrets  about helping  Pakistan  acquire a  nuclear deterrent .²  For them , India had cheated  the world  by testing  a  nuclear device  and dubbing it a “ peaceful nuclear test”  (PNE) , posing  direct threat to Pakistan. ³

Regardless of the individual  contribution , the series of procurement events  illustrate the dynamic nature of Pakistan’s  efforts.  From maraging steel  to cascade pipes to inverters  and everything in between , Pakistan  actively sought out opportunities, instilled  business competition , and worked ahead  to stay ahead of the non proliferation regime.

Under U.S. pressure  the Germans put on hold  the sale of eight  power reactors , a uranium enrichment facility , and a plutonium  reprocessing plant to Brazil ( then a non signatory  to NPT). If completed  , that deal would have yielded  multibillion  dollar profits.  The German industry  was frustrated  that non proliferation  and moral arguments  selectively  hurt European business  , while U.S . nuclear  industries  such as  Westinghouse and General Electric thrived. ⁴   It is therefore no surprise  that Germany  was the main supplier  of components to Pakistan. ⁵ For example , in 1975 there was a  major purchase  of three “ roller , high compression  machines”  from Dusseldorf  Germany , which  boasted  a dual a dual –use  application  to make stainless  steel  utensils  and casings for artillery  shells. ⁶ Some European suppliers  were very generous , and offered  to sell items  not on the Pakistani wish list . Two other important procurements  were also made  that year : an electronic beam welding  machine  and a ring magnet  charging machine. ⁷ These purchases  were part of the initial PAEC strategy  to undertake large-scale  procurements in an effort to avoid future shortages. ⁸

German companies were chosen  as the primary  suppliers  because A.Q.  Khan recognized that German expertise  in machine tools  and precision  engineering  was second  to none and contributed  greatly  to the enrichment  industry  as a whole . In addition , since  Germany  was  not a nuclear power  , it employed  more lenient  export controls.

Competition for Pakistan’s  business among  European firms  continued,  even in the more  restricted advanced technology  market.  Thus U.S. public non proliferation  reprimands  produced  modest results , as demonstrated  by Germany’s  meager  response  to nearly  one hundred demarches.  But the Pakistanis detected  this international pressure  and quickly made use  of extensive contacts. The German magazine  Stern  reported  that about seventy  German  firms conducted  nuclear-related  business  with Pakistani  --associated  enterprises  throughout 1980s. ⁹

By far the most significant  event in the enrichment  project  was the procurement  of high-frequency  inverters from the British firm Emerson Electric. These components  were especially important  as they ensured  uniformity  in power supply  to the centrifuges. But these purchases  did not go undetected. The exposure  of the Pakistani imports  from Britain  alerted various  intelligence  agencies around the world. The Israeli Mossad  , in particular, viewed Pakistani procurement  as making possible as “ Islamic Bomb” . Pakistan ‘s supply of luck  was large , but it was not limitless . As A.Q. Khan’s audacious  attempts  to acquire  sensitive technologies  caught the attention  of business  and government around the world , international pressure mounted on countries  to control  nuclear trade , and they slowly  roused themselves  to the task. Bilaterally and through  multilateral organizations , states  slowly  harmonized  export controls  to prevent  Pakistan  and others from seeking  and exploiting  weak national  regulations. Simultaneously , state regulators sought  control further down the production chain.

But even with the rising barriers  , one main  strategy  sustained  the procurement network ---as soon as Pakistani officials  found one firm  that was either unwilling  to deal with them or was suspicious  of their intent , they always found  a willing substitute.  These companies were in competition with each other  , and Pakistan offered  high price . All of these purchases  and agreements  for cooperation  required money  . The Pakistani economy was in a shambles throughout  the time that the procurement  network  was forming, yet officials  were still able to pay premium  prices  for expensive technologies. It was generous countries  such as Libya  and Saudi Arabia  that financed  the Pakistani economy  as a whole , and mitigated the impact of Western Sanctions. Nevertheless, despite  economic   and military  aid, Pakistani  official  had to devise a way  to sustain  the nuclear program . The answer  came from Bank of Credit and commerce International (BCCI)  and its Pakistani owner , Hassan Abidi. Thus the BCCI paid for Pakistan’s nuclear program  via front companies  and institutions  until its collapse in 1991.

Procurement Strategies:   

Pakistani officials  utilized  numerous strategies  to consolidate the multiple  channel, connections, and techniques during  their procurement efforts. ¹⁰ These included :

1-    Diplomatic  channels. Almost  all the Pakistan embassies  around  the world helped  procurement  efforts  by using  their diplomatic dispatches;

2-    Staying ahead of the curve . Pakistani imports adjusted  and shifted  as different export  controls were applied . Purchases  shifted from buying  entire units to acquiring  smaller,  independent  components  to unfinished  products;

3-    Needle in the haystack . Pakistan  would buy many benign  and unusually  technologies and hide  a  critical  component  within the lengthy purchase ;

4-    Willingness to pay high prices . Pakistan  would offer to pay twice the original price;

5-    Reverse engineering . Pakistan  would purchase  samples and then  reproduce them domestically;

6-    Multile attempts  and connections. At least three or four  different agents  would buy from different companies . Once a set of choices  was established , the agents would evaluate  the ease of exportation  and transportation;

7-    End user justification. Pakistan  would  provide  the supplier  with  numerous  front companies  and legitimate  reasons  for procurement, which could then be later verified;

8-    Diverse intermediaries  and shipping routes( trans-shipment) . Very few  direct transportation  routes to Pakistan existed; most  items  would go through intermediaries  and numerous countries  before reaching their final destinations;

9-    Help from sympathetic  countries. China , North Korea, and friendly Islamic  countries  would be willing conduits  of shipments or sources of money;

10-The Pakistani diaspora . Professionals scattered  around the globe would contribute extensively to the nation’s cause;

11- Connections with a   variety of entities . Pakistan  had made friends  with numerous  individuals , companies , and business around the globe.;

12-Front companies . Pakistan  created so many that they  overwhelmed  the system.

Unfortunately, once Pakistan’s own requirements were complete, this network would then acquire a life of its own, as other interested  countries would be attracted to its benefits.  

References embedded in the Post will be provided later.

Dr. I.R.Durrani

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Posted in A.Q. Khan, BCCI, Emerson Electric, Grey Market, Hassan Abidi, Nuclear network