FOOL'S GOLD!!!

FOOL’S GOLD:

Pakistan’s nuclear assets  may allure  terrorists. However, security experts are split  on the actual threat  that is being posed.   Some of these experts assert that  Pakistan’s nuclear  assets are on the verge  of seizure  by terrorists . Other experts  contend  that such a  risk is at best, minimal. Therefore,  the real threat assessment has so far not been made . Such an assessment ought to  go  beyond merely considering putative vulnerabilities and otherwise  assumed terrorist  capability. 

Pakistan has all along been considered a potential  source of nuclear weapons, more specifically  for the covetous  terrorists . This state of affairs obtained even before Pakistan had acquired  a full-fledged  nuclear program. Not only that, this status existed  decades before we  demonstrated  a yield bearing  nuclear  explosive capability. The West was distressed  by the dissemination of nuclear technologies  and expertise to politically unstable countries. Their  military intelligence historians fore- warned  that a nuclear armed Pakistan would exponentially increase the probability of terrorist use of nuclear weapons. At present , an international chorus—well oiled and orchestrated ,   still warns  that Pakistan--- presently armed with  ~ 200 nuclear weapons is the epicenter of violent Islamism. It is suspected that   terrorist group actively seek  nuclear weapons from within this country. How real is the risk, suspicions notwithstanding ? There are two groups  of experts, who have positioned themselves  on opposite ends of the risk spectrum. These optimists and pessimists consider valid variables . However, they  fail to  evaluate  all the critical  factors. These factors include   necessary analysis   for a  methodologically robust and defensible  threat assessment, concerning  Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

The pessimists , on the other hand, contend  the risk  has grown . This group warns that  the safety  and security  of nuclear weapons  materials  in Pakistan may very well be compromised. That happenstance may occur at some point in the near future. For almost a  decade, now,   there have been calls  for US contingency  plans to take the following steps:

1-    Either destroy ,

2-    Or  temporarily secure in place ,

3-     Or exfiltrate,

Pakistani nuclear assets. Such actions should be initiated   in the event of widespread civil unrest . Or in case of  a governmental coup  that leads to an empowering of  Islamists  forces. Quite to the contrary , optimists maintain Pakistan’s nuclear weapons infrastructure is secure. They contend  the threat posed by the terrorists is overblown and exaggerated . These optimists argue that  perceptions  of vulnerability  do not adequately consider the implementation of various technical precautions. Further they politicize  advances in Pakistan’s reliability  program. Further the optimists emphasize that Pakistan maintains its nuclear arsenal  in a dissemble state. By that they imply that the nuclear weapons are  kept in  a bifurcated  manner where the weapons’ fissile  cores are  separated from the non –nuclear components. These two constituents are separate entirely from the  delivery platform. Pakistani officials maintain  that  during times  of impending or imminent  crisis , like  the 2001-2 standoff  with India, these components were never mated.  While handling  components  , or an intact weapon , Pakistan claims to abide  by two-man or three-man rules. Commensurately , a very tight  selection  for vetting personnel involved with nuclear weapons, is carried out under severe vigilance. Additionally the optimists  downplay  the threat posed by violent Islamists. They also wave off the risks associated  with the domestic  political instability. Summarily , Pakistan’s nuclear assets  are either on the brink of successful seizure by the terrorists , or they are secure. However, based on  unclassified  information , neither position is tenable. Neither  the  optimists’  nor the pessimists’  positions are defensible. In fact both positions merely  review  assumed terrorist capabilities. Separately they ascertain  putative vulnerabilities of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Unfortunately today , few assessments  consider whether  or not relevant  Pakistani  groups  are motivated  to attack  these assets. Further they fail to reach a consensus as to  what the terrorists’  operational goals  might be. It is because of  these yawning   gaps in current threat assessments  that  no definitive  determinations can be made while considering  the security  of Pakistan’s  nuclear infrastructure.

Risk assessment are comprised of two broad components : chance and consequence . The latter is not  relevant here,  apart from how the attacker’s perception  of consequence management affects his or her motivation  and method of attack.  Chance is addressed by means of a process called threat assessment  which encompasses three ingredients. The first and the second  are assessments  of the value and vulnerability of the  asset in question. The third is the likelihood of an attack  which depends on who the attackers might be , their motivations for an attack, and their perceived capabilities. In assessing the likelihood of an attack one cannot over emphasize  the importance  of the attacker’s perception  of the target’s value  and vulnerability. Figure 1 illustrates this interconnectedness with the attacker’s perception  represented by a dotted line.

There has yet been no  public indication  that terrorist groups  are interested in acquiring  nuclear weapons.  Today’s terrorists’ intentions remain largely unexplored by the nuclear security ‘s assessment experts. Erroneously , intent is essentially treated to be solely  a  derivative  of a group’s capability  and the vulnerability of the target under a would be attack.  Assuming Pakistan’s nuclear assets are at risk , we have to ascertain  what groups  might credibly threaten them? Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Neo Taliban (PNT) typically fervent the most concern . Al Qaeda , however, entirely on its own,  has not  yet conducted operationally  sophisticated attacks  within Pakistan.  Al Qaeda’s relevant attacks in Pakistan have been closely linked to , id not carried out in their entirety  by former Kashmiri fighters , foreign jihadists  and tribal militants. All the three latter groups are off shoots of the PNT.  Many analysts are firm in their belief that the Pakistan’s nuclear assets are safe from a credible Al Qaeda threat --- at least for the interim. Summarily were Al Qaeda to attack the nuclear assets, with a view to possessing them , it will depend hugely on personnel of PNT. It is therefore logical to concentrate on PNT , more specifically its largest  and most capable constituent , Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan , the TTP , meaning the movement  of the Pakistani Taliban, which forms the most credible threat. Largely an umbrella organization the TTP is composed of dozens of other mushrooming groups  and factions that do not coalesce . These factions disagree , often violently and vociferously  about tactical  and at times strategic objectives.

We are not absolutely clear about TTP’s perceived value of Pakistani nuclear assets.  However, what remains crystal clear is the TTP and is allies recognize the fact that both regional and international communities   view Pakistan’s nuclear program as a  major element   affecting the region’s geopolitical milieu. Our nuclear assets not only have tangible value –deterrence role , war fighting—it also has a symbolic value. The former value, in case of Pakistan’s nuclear assets , is determined by the outcome of a successful terrorist attack . Such an attack seizes  and removes or uses in situ nuclear weapons and materials. Contrarily , the latter value allows  for suboptimal  attack outcomes—attempts that are thwarted. Herein the asset’s value is not entirely endogenous . It also entails a symbolic slant. It often transpires that  even credible threatening  to attack a symbolic target may carry perceived benefits to the attacker. Therefore one can argue that before determining  the value of a given Pakistani nuclear asset , one must weigh how the attacker is likely to define success. An asset’s vulnerability likewise relates to two factors:

1-    Measureable  objective qualities

2-    Attacker’s perception of asset security.

In general  the decisions to attack are not influenced by the defender’s perception of the target’s vulnerability ; rather , they are reflective of  the attacker’s perception.  Concerning the target’s vulnerability,  insiders may also   be able to apprise the attacker accordingly.

A subjective equation governs the likelihood of an attack. The likelihood of an attack is calculated in part through the appreciation of a target’s perceived value  including :

1-    Instrumental ;

2-    Symbolic

as well as its vulnerability both perceived and in its actuality. A likelihood of an attack is also crucially shaped  by attacker’s intentions and/or motivations  together with his perceived innate capabilities. Intention of the attacker is partially regulated by :

1-    The attacker’s  perception of the target’s value

2-    And the target’s  vulnerability.

In addition , the attacker’s motivations are influenced  by the following three factors in the main:

1-    An ideological agenda

2-    Operational objectives and,

3-    Perceived operational  capability.

It is indeed disturbing to realize that studies in nuclear terrorism  reveal an utter disregard  for the pivotal role  of ideology  in dictating  a group’s likelihood  to secure nuclear arsenal. This is quite unfortunate , as ideology is quite likely the strongest factor in determining  why a group might choose to pursue a  policy  to secure a capability for nuclear weapons. It has been ascertained though perfunctorily that the terrorists’ ideology is the central motif. It provides the initial dynamics for the terrorists’ actions. The ideology also sets  out the moral framework  within which they operate.   A group’s ideology is extremely important because it marks the enemies of the group to be either ‘innocent’ or ‘ guilty’ ; this in turn accentuates the idea that certain people or institutions are legitimate targets.  Ideology is the behavioral driver of extremists. The terrorists may be inhibited for moral or arcane  doctrinal reasons  from carrying out attacks that are likely to cause mass casualties. Alternatively groups that possess  apocalyptic eschatology may well be drawn to secure nuclear weapons. Violent extremist  groups are absolutely convinced  that they are doing God’s bidding . They are certain that whatever action they decide to undertake  can be justified  , no matter how vicious and heinous , since the divine ends are thought to justify the means.

Additionally  a group’s  operational  objectives  area  central  element in determining an intent to attack  a given nuclear asset. There may be other goals as well , the successful seizing and spiriting away  or using in position –nuclear weapons  or fissile materials is arguably  the most likely objective of an imminent terrorists’ attack on Pakistan’s nuclear assets. While assuming that groups  are predisposed  to an assault  on Pakistan’s  nuclear infrastructure, experts  unanimously portray  such an attack to have just the objective  of successfully seizing  or using nuclear weapons or materials. That would make the attack to be largely instrumental.  In case the group’s intention is entirely symbolic , then belief in moderate operational  capabilities may be sufficient to meet the requirements of the attack. A more precise  threat assessment of Pakistan’s nuclear materials  should measure  relevant  terrorist’s  perception  of the value and the asset’s vulnerability. Terrorists’ motivation informed by ideology , operational goals and capabilities must also be critically accounted for.

Both pessimists and optimists claim an accurate  understanding  of the threats  facing Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure. Pessimists typically employ threat assessment  methodologies that infer terrorists motivation and capability while assuming  that Pakistan’s  nuclear –related  safeguards   mirror that of its other  important military assets. Optimists demonstrate flawed methodologies as well , by arguing that Pakistan’s nuclear command and control  is assertive  and consequently immune from unauthorized usage. These optimists , quite foolhardy , as they are assert that Pakistan’s military  is largely free  from militant threat . They offer largely artificial and static assessments and may be cut off from recent realities.

Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure, as it is, is alarmingly insecure . The concerning threat assessment is typically  emphasized by three supporting factors:

1-    Observers generally believe that a  variety of militants operating in Pakistan , notably the TTP  are motivated  to acquire nuclear  capability. Although the militants  have not made any statements  of nuclear intent, experts  often point to declarations linked to Al Qaeda  specifically the May 2003 fatwa delivered by Saudi  Shaykh Nasir ibn Hamid  al Fahd  allowing the use  of chemical , biological  and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Since, at least 1994 , certain jihadist groups , conflated with the TTP , have expressed  motivation  to acquire  CBRN weapons . Since 2003 , such desires and covetousness  have been linked  by some religious authorities.

2-    Pessimists argue  the TTP is not only motivated  but also increasingly capable  of acquiring  a nuclear weapon. According to experts , the operational sophistication  of some attacks  --specifically the October 2009 TTP assault  on the Pakistan Army GHQ in Rawalpindi  reflect modalities  that add up to a virtual blue print  for a successful  attack on a nuclear weapons facility.

3-    Pessimist commentators warn  that critical elements of Pakistan’s  nuclear infrastructure are vulnerable  to certain types of terrorists attacks. Perceived insecurities are usually inferred from the following factors:

(a)  It is assumed that with a proliferation of nuclear weapons  and their dispersal  at an increasing number of sites , the security challenges  are ever growing in this country. The qualitative evolution of its arsenal is a further concern including warhead miniaturization  which allow for war heads that easier to seize and transport.

(b) Pakistan’s determination to expand its arsenal , suggests it may be augmenting its nuclear posture  to include asymmetrical escalation . By expanding the delivery system for a  pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons  against Indian forces within its borders, Pakistan needs to disperse warheads . A pre-delegation of these war heads outside of the central command,  would allow local commanders to use nuclear weapons  technically called a “ peripheral launch capability.”  With terrorists  operating in a pre-delegative environment , they would have better chances of seizing and whisking away nuclear weapons not strictly under centralized state control.

(c)  With the growth of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure  more people have access to sensitive material, data , codes  and information: there are Trojan Horses within the nuclear network and an insider collusion  can never be discounted more so  after the May 2011 attack on Mehran naval aviation base—and there is every likelihood of a similar invasion of nuclear weapons facility.

Summarizing , pessimists assert that groups like the TTP have the motivation, capability , and , because of vulnerabilities , the opportunity  to successfully seize or use in situ  Pakistani nuclear assets. However, pessimists’ risk assessment is entirely inference based.

Now to the Optimists and their risk assessment which again is based on inference.

Interestingly , experts both pessimists and optimists have a consensus in two key regards:

1-    They accept  that violent  Islamists  are motivated  to acquire Pakistani nuclear assets;

2-    Both agree that TTP is displaying  a growing capability to conduct  sophisticated  operations.

Concerning perceived  asset vulnerabilities, is where these Experts  differ.

Regarding pre-delegation , optimists  counter the pessimists’ stance by stating that Pakistan  likely maintains  a centralized  nuclear command  for three reasons in the main:

1-    Pakistan’s internal unrest requires  close arsenal guardian ship  and stringent measures to prevent a seizure of nuclear weapon components  and accidental or unauthorized detonation.

2-    Pakistan must placate US nuclear command and control concerns to maintain an influx of generous uninterrupted  aid.

3-    Pakistan must  show India  that its arsenal is  stable in  both peacetime  and crisis  to obviate a possibility of “ preventative” conventional or nuclear strike.

Optimists, though acknowledging  the presence of militants  within the military , argue that the possibility of an Islamist-led military coup  and consequent possession of nuclear weapons by terrorists, is extremely remote. In case Islamists do indeed seize power, optimists maintain  that they would not seek to change  Pakistan’s foreign policy –a behavior that would occlude nuclear collaboration with the militants. With regard to insider collusion , attempts at seizure would fail  as the rogue elements would have to fight their way through several layers  of highly motivated  personnel  who are armed to their teeth.

Much as I have argued earlier , Pakistan’s  nuclear posture  is changing intoa  configuration  that ebraces war fighting  and pre-delegation.  Centralized  control of nuclear weapons  is likely to be partial at best , especially during times of turmoil.  After almost a decade of civil war now culminating in  Zarb- e Azb, Pakistan ‘s military is beginning to show signs  of renewed  terrorist collusion , this time with groups  that actively oppose  the United States and other Western Powers. As of today Imran Khan is leading a lock up in Lahore. Political instability is very much in the offing. The difference between the have and the have nots , is a gaping hole ever yawning.  Every day is a burden . The Herods could not care less. The Conspiracy in the Corridors is ringing a death knell for the Rulers. A void at the top will not take too long in forming. That void will have to be filled up . The militants will do so in collusion with the Army. The nuclear weapon which took this country several decades to achieve ; so many lives were lost in the struggle ; the Man who was prepared to eat grass but make Pakistan nuclear was hung. All the effort , painstaking and sedulous as it was, may all turn out to be in vain ---the glory short-timed may after all have been a  vain glory.  The Grand Detonation that turned the Chaghai  Hill in Baluchistan, entirely black  ---may implode  and destroy the very fabric of this country. The Gold we all tried to mine in the Chaghai Hills may turn out to be Fool’s Gold at the end of the day!! .    

        

                        

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