PAKISTAN'S MISSILE QUEST

PAKISTAN’S MISSILE QUEST

Although ballistic missiles today are the mainstay of Pakistan’s nuclear delivery system, the acquisition , development , flight-testing, and introduction of ballistic missiles  into Pakistani  strategic  arsenals  was as arduous a process as was the development of the nuclear program a decade earlier. As in the case of its approach to the nuclear program , Pakistan initially avoided  investing in rockets , ballistic missiles , or a space program  when there existed an opportunity to acquire  technology  through cooperation. Then a series  of military crises in the mid-1980s and the successful  Indian Prithvi  and Agni  missile tests spurred the development  of a modest  Pakistani  rocket program. However, it was the summer  1990  military crises  and subsequent  shock  of the U.S.  nuclear sanctions  in the same year that propelled  missile technology  acquisition into full speed.

When Pakistan attempted to respond  to India’s  series of missile –flight  tests in 1988 and 1989, the West provided the same advice  to Islamabad  that it had regarding the nuclear program: India’s acquisitions  should be ignored  and Pakistan  should  take up the moral  high ground  and adhere to nonproliferation  norms. As before, dependence on economic  and military aid made Pakistan  more vulnerable  to Western coercion. The United States  virtually  abandoned the region , imposed  nuclear sanctions, and refused  to supply Pakistan  with more F-16s—Pakistan’s primary  delivery vehicle for nuclear warheads. So the more that the West, specifically the United States, pressured Pakistan  to exercise restraint , the more its resolve grew to match India’s strategic force. Once again , Islamabad  perceived  India’s treatment as preferential , and Pakistan’s as punishment  for redressing  its security concerns.

Indeed, Pakistan ‘s strategic culture is the best explanation  for its near panic to meet the new challenges posed by its chief adversary . As nationalism  gripped  the isolated country  , missile scientists  and technicians found a  new sense  of pride  and motivation  in their tasks . Finding no prospects for cooperation in Europe in the 1990s , Pakistan  again looked  to its strategic  ally China and willing suppliers in the Far East.  Predictably,  another  familiar  pattern would emerge ---inter-laboratory rivalry between the Pakistan atomic Energy Commission( PAEC) and Khan Research Laboratory ( KRL)  , this time to master  solid fuel  and liquid  fuel  technologies for missiles.

Initial Pakistani Missile Development:  In the early 1980s , the arrival  of F-16 jet fighter  aircraft  from the United States  provided  Pakistan  with an operationally  reliable  method  of delivery  for its nascent  nuclear arsenal. Cold tests  that included  bomb-delivery  simulations relied upon these aircraft  and Mirage—V attack  aircraft from France. Pakistan’s long reliance  on U.S. assistance  forced  the leadership  to offer a freeze  of its nuclear program  in return  for renewed  military cooperation . In response , the United States  made new demands : to destroy  the existing  nuclear cores  and to “ roll –back its capability  to the other side of the line.”¹  Clearly , a few F-16s  were not worth sacrificing  the nuclear program , so, after absorbing  the disbelief  and shock, Pakistan began to consider an alternative delivery system . The United States had overestimated its leverage  and inadvertently  fueled  the Pakistani missile program . From that point on , missile development  joined weapons at the top rung of Pakistan’s  national  security priorities.

Throughout the 1960s  and 1970s  both Pakistan and India  had developed  some basic rocketry  and space –launch  technologies  through their civilian  space programs , ²  but it was not until  the latter  began its Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP) in 1983 that the missile race began in earnest. ³

Space and Upper Atmosphere  Research Commission ( SUPARCO) established in 1961 was originally  in the Space Sciences Research Wing  of the PAEC before it became a separate organization in 1964. These entities collaborated  with the U.S.  National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in June 1962 to launch Pakistani research “ sounding rockets” Rehbar—I  and Rehbar—II . Pakistan’s eventual capability  to develop  a ballistic missile  program  derived  from the knowledge  its scientists obtained through its  cooperation  with NASA on sounding rockets. ⁴

Solid –Motor Hatfs: Aside from a few inaccurate  ballistic missiles and Soviet Scuds  that were fired into Pakistani  tribal areas  from Afghanistan , Pakistan  had very little with which to start  a missile program. ⁵ SUPARCO with the assistance of KRL , a team  hastily combined  various  available  technologies  to produce  the first surface—to—surface  missiles , dubbed Hatf I and Hatf II . The Hatf I is a single  -stage solid motor  , battlefield range  missile capable  of delivering  a five hundred-kg payload  over a  maximum  range  of eighty to one hundred km.  Hatf II  was a modified version of Hatf –I  and is composed of a second stage  and a new  boost motor  added to the first stage –still a short range missile  but with increased reach  and payload capabilities. In response  to India’s  demonstration of the Prithvi  ballistic missile , in February 1989 Pakistan tested  the two Hatf  missiles  and declared the tests a success.  In May 2002 , at the peak of the crises with India , the Hatf II /Abdali was flight tested  along with other categories  of missiles and later was finally inducted  into the army’s strategic force command.

Strategic Missile Cooperation : China: Islamabad’s logical  option  was to turn  to its long –time strategic ally , China, for help. Conveniently , China  was not a member  of the MTCR at the time  and was opposed  on principle  to export control cartels.

Ghaznavi ( Hatf—III) : U.S. Sources  believe that initial  transfers  of some thirty assembled M-11 missiles  were made to Pakistan  in 1992. The Chinese transfer of M-11 technology  was only  for high-explosive warheads.  Having undergone the design modifications, a new missile named Ghaznavi  could carry a five-hundred-kg payload , sufficient  for a second –generation  nuclear warhead , but not suitable for Pakistan’s heavier  first-generation  weapons. The missile has an inertial  guidance system  and uses jet vanes in the nozzle to make  trajectory  corrections  during the boost  phase. Over the next three years  further technical  improvements  were made  to the heat  shielding  areas, and after several tests  a new batch  of Ghaznavi  missiles  were inducted  into the Army Strategic Forces Command( ASAF) in April 2007. Finally , February 2008 marked  the successful  flight test  of this missile by ASAF.

Shaheen: Hatf IV and VI : The missile  designated  as Shaheen –I ( Hatf –IV) was first publicly displayed  at the National day Parade in march 1999 and then under went several  flight tests thereafter.  The Shaheen –I is a single stage , solid fueled  , road mobile , short-range  ballistic missile  with  a maximum range of  seven hundred km and able to deliver a five-hundred  -kg payload. In January 2008, a flight test of Shaheen-  I was conducted  successfully  and the missile is currently operational.   

 Shaheen – II/  Hatf ---VI: The Shaheen II was first displayed  during  an October 2003, national day Parade . The first  flight test  of the twenty-five-ton  Shaheen –II  occurred  in march 2004  at the Somiani  Flight Test Range  on the Arabian  Sea  and was claimed  to have  covered  1880 km . Shaheen II  underwent four more tests  , in march 2005,  April 2006, February 2007, and April 2008. The last test was conducted  by ASAF , an indication  that it was inducted into the army arsenal.  It may be added here that the solid propellants used in the M-series missiles  have a finite  shelf life. After that time safety  and reliability  are increasingly  compromised. Hence Pakistan went on the lookout for Liquid Fuel.

WHY Liquid Fuel? : Pakistan developed  a strategic connection  with the unpopular  North Korea regime, which was selling untested  and relatively  unattractive  technologies , in an attempt to acquire  a liquid fuel platform.  Why would  Pakistan  want a  liquid  fueled  missile  when it had  access  to solid fuel  from China?  After all,  Islamabad was  already  under nuclear sanctions, making  this acquisition  a political risk that could  alienate  Japan and United States.

  Three rationales  might explain why  this choice was made. First , the range –payload  characteristics  of the solid propellant  systems  from China  limited Pakistan’s  ability to deliver  a nuclear weapon  to the heart of Indian territory. The North Korean  Nodong missile  has a larger  maximum  payload  capacity  ( 700 to 1000 kg ) and can cover  more territory  ( one thousand  to thirteen hundred km).  Moreover, the liquid  fuel technology  from North Korea  was offered  at inexpensive  rates, as both  the buyer  and seller  were poor countries  with high-premium  national security  requirements  and economic exigencies.  Second, inter-institutional  rivalries  between the PAEC and the KRL  prompted  the latter to seek and independent channel for missile acquisition. The two institutions  had a  history  of competition  throughout the nuclear weapons program , and it seemed only  logical  that the rivalry  would extend to missile delivery system. ⁶  Finally both  north Korea  and Pakistan  were desperate  : Pyongyang needed another party willing  to test the Nodong  technology  , as the North Korean  geography did not permit  frequent tests, and Pakistan  knew that their supply  routes would be cut off sooner or later. The fear of rejection  was not restricted to the West, but extended even to China. The decision to cooperate with Pyongyang  resulted in a  competition  between  China  and North Korea, as the  former discouraged Pakistan  from closely  cooperating with Pyongyang . Islamabad’s  dealings  with the pariah state  could have dragged  China  into controversy . more important,  Beijing  enjoyed the market  monopoly  it held  with regard  to missile  technology  transfers to Pakistan.

North Korea and KRL: As early as June 1992 , representatives  from KRL  and government  officials from key agencies  visited the Sanum –dong guided  missile development  centre in North Korea  to examine the  Nodong. The  Nodong  technology is based  on a  Soviet missile system  speculated  to be “ an upscale  version  of the Soviet R-17 missile.⁷   The missile’s basic  airframe  is made from steel  , while other  sections  are made from aluminum. The propulsion  system is a liquid –fueled engine  that uses  a  combination  of inhibited red  fuming nitric acid and kerosene. During the boost phase,  four jet vanes  are used  for thrust  vector control , and the missile  is also believed  to use three body –mounted  gyros  for altitude  and lateral acceleration  control. With a payload  of 700 to 1300 kg , the Nodong  is capable of carrying both high explosive  conventional  and nuclear warheads. ⁸

The deal was cemented in late 1995 and the missiles were delivered in the fall of 1997. Just as the Chinese  had established  a turnkey  facility for the M series  solid fuel missile, North Korea  undertook a parallel  effort for the liquid fuel missiles.

Ghauri/ Hatf –V:  The Ghauri ( Hatf—V) is a single –stage , liquid propelled  missile capable of delivering  a 700  to 1300 kg payload  an estimated  eight hundred  to fifteen hundred  km. It was first tested in Pakistan in April 1998. Two additional  test flights  were conducted , in April 1999 and May 2002; since then  Pakistan has conducted  several flight tests  of Ghauri-I  : in April 1999, May 2002, may 2004, June 2004, October 2004 and November 2006. ⁹ In February 2008, the Strategic Missile Group (SMG) of the ASAF  tested Ghauri as part of an exercise , indicating  operational deployment.

Ghuri II and III: Improvements , reverse engineering  , and synergizing  expertise  from various  strategic organizations allowed  the Ghauri project  to continue into  Ghauri II and III  missiles whose ranges  were intended to reach  more deeply into India. Pakistan ‘s long term  plans  are classified  , but from it is evident that ballistic missiles  will remain the mainstay  of the arsenal  and the technicians  will focus  on improving  ranges  and accuracy , as well as the reentry, telemetries , and guidance  systems.

Quid Pro Quo or Money?  In February 2004, Pakistan admitted  publicly  that the missile technology  from North Korea  had been obtained  with cash. ¹⁰ The United imposed sanctions  on KRL and North Korea’s Chaggwang Sinyong Corporation in  March 2003  for engaging in proliferation  activities. ¹¹

Cruise Missiles:

Babur/ Hatf –VII : Islamabad came under  further pressure  to respond  when India’s  cooperative program  with Russia  on the development  of the Brahmos supersonic  cruise missile began . In August 2005, Pakistan  conducted the first test  of its Babur ( Hatf –VII) cruise missile . Babar is a subsonic missile  that can carry  both nuclear  and conventional payloads  and has a range of  seven hundred km , although its range after the test  was five hundred  km. It  is a  terrain hugging  missile,  making detection  by ground based  radars  difficult. ¹² Pakistan maintains  that its cruise  missile technology  was developed  indigenously , but U.S. experts suspect  that Babar is based on the Chinese  DH-10 missile.

Ra’ad/ Hatf –VII: In April 2011, Pakistan  introduced a new weapons system . A short-range  surface—to –surface , two tube  rocket launcher , believed to be a Chinese-design  multiple  rocket launcher , is mounted  on an eight  --wheeler  transporter  erector  launcher  carrying a  20 –foot ballistic missile  with a diameter  of about 3000 mm. The system is stated to be capable  of carrying  either conventional  or nuclear  warheads . The debate rages  on at  this time whether such a  system will have a  deterrence  effect in the battlefield or otherwise. Regardless , the introduction  of such a  battlefield nuclear weapon system  will pose three major challenges  affecting stability.  First, its  short range  would warrant  its deployment close  to Pakistan ‘s own troops , close to the border , which will increase field security issues;  second,  the command  and control  of such a system  will be very complicated , bringing into question  whether to retain  central  control or delegate  it to field  formations for greater  battle  effectiveness; and lastly , such a  battle system with its peculiar signals  will likely induce  preemptive  pressures  on India  or any other adversary  to attack  with conventional  weapons, thus triggering  a premature  or even unintended war. ¹³ 

Missile Deployments and Strategic Impact: Pakistan ‘s missile force  satisfy most of the country ‘s strategic needs , at least  those that relate to India.  And since Pakistan  does not currently  have large  regional aspirations  or other threatening  adversaries  , developing  intercontinental  missiles will not be a priority  for Islamabad. Rather , increasing  its self sufficiency  in the area  of short –and medium range missile development  and production  will very likely  be the focus of Pakistan’s future activities.

Dr. I.R. Durrani

PS: The references embedded in the text will be provided later!! 

Posted in A Q Khan, KRL, Missiles, PAEC, PRC, Proliferation, Reverse Engineering