NUCLEAR
PAKISTAN AND THE WORLD:
Pakistan
has suffered multiple shocks in the ten years since the A.Q. Khan network exposure. The strategic
landscape has drastically changed
, and the domestic situation is
especially worrisome. Terrorists and violent extremism threaten to impose their will
by continuous challenge to state authority. After years of fighting in Afghanistan , the prospects for stability and peace appear dim. The United States has increased
counter-terror strikes against
suspected militants strongholds in the tribal
borderlands , and Pakistan’s armed forces are spread thin assisting these missions. Meanwhile,
hundreds of suicide attacks have
targeted Pakistani hotels , marketplaces
, Sufi shrines , government offices , and military head quarters. As political
forces struggle for power and influence , sectarian and ethnic conflicts span the whole country ---most notably in Karachi and Baluchistan . The ensuing political
instability and plummeting economy
are eating the state from within , even while the country steadily
progresses towards its strategic
weapons force goals.
Having
survived more than four decades of
trials and tribulations , the nuclear program has been fueled
by a strategic culture
filled with historic grievances , military defeats
, and paranoia. Pakistan has procured,
built , secured , and managed one of the most advanced technologies
in the world and has good
reason to be proud of its
capability. There is almost no other comparable achievement in the country’s
history. Today the armed forces and the civilian bureaucracy , from the religious right to the liberal left , all support Pakistan’s
continued nuclear weapons
capability . The nuclear factor
is so deeply embedded in national security thinking that any step
toward disarmament would be met
with stiff resistance. Moreover , there is a strong
consensus that Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons are under a constant threat from hostile countries , which include the
United States , Israel and India. Pakistanis believe that their
nuclear arsenal remains
vulnerable to preventive or preemptive attacks, and thus even a
rumor of attack prompts the armed
forces to take precautionary measures. 1
Undoubtedly
, the people of Pakistan have paid a heavy
price , and many of their economic
woes are the consequences of national security decisions
taken since 1972. Indeed,
preserving the nuclear capability has been the cornerstone of many
leaders’ decision –making processes. To
attain the nuclear capability was an end in itself and any means
were justified , including forcing a people to eat grass in sacrifice. So how will Pakistan’s nuclear
arsenal impact the country’s future
trajectory?
Proliferation
pessimists worry that a nuclear
Pakistan will encourage other states to follow suit and increases the likelihood of nuclear weapons use in South Asia . Still others believe that nuclear weapons have actually
exacerbated regional security problems and caused crises, and still others worry
about terrorists acquiring the weapons
or materials . 2 Optimists
credit the absence of wars and
contained military crises to a nuclear
weapons arsenal. 3 These
same positive-minded individuals point out
that there has been no major
breach either of safety or of
nuclear security in the country. 4 After all ,
Pakistan cooperated with the international
community to shut down the A.Q. Khan network and to improve its command and control
over weapons and materials. 5
Nevertheless,
Pakistan ‘s biggest challenge to its
deterrent has nothing to do with fissile
material stocks , delivery means , or an ambiguous nuclear doctrine , but rather rests on future
internal threats. For Pakistan to maintain
a strategic balance and avoid
increased conflict with India , it must
uphold social cohesion , government
stability , and sustained
economic growth.6
The Role of Nuclear Weapons: The
Pakistanis see no role for nuclear
weapons other than to deter India from waging a conventional war. This was the
original purpose for the program , and it stands to this day ---
notwithstanding the fact that Pakistan
is vulnerable to an Indian attack because it is internally weak and divided.
This situation poses a paradox because nuclear deterrence can work
effectively only if other
vulnerabilities and weaknesses do not
exist. Vulnerabilities are tempting and challenge the credibility of deterrence . In fact, India’s basic premise
to wage a limited war against Pakistan is to punish the country in response to what it calls state-sponsored-terrorism
or threats that are hatched and waged
from the Pakistani soil with or
without the connivance of the state or its entities . Pakistan
dismisses this rationale and argues that
Pakistan has suffered more from violent
extremists and spillover of Afghan
instability , and that India is simply using the post 9/11
environment to wage a war against its long term adversary. Should India
wage a limited war and succeed in terminating it on its terms , deterrence will have
failed. From the Pakistani perspective , to enhance the credibility, it is forced to risk the use of nuclear weapons simply
to stop India in its tracks. However, the bottom line is that nuclear
weapons alone cannot
constitute an effective national security if other elements of national power remain dangerously weak.
Emerging Force Goals: Even
though the purpose of nuclear weapons is clear, Pakistan is still in the early
stages of nuclear learning . The Kargil
episode demonstrated that Pakistani
strategic thinking was dominated
by conventional military logic. In 2002 crisis , the ambiguity of its nuclear use doctrine
was scrutinized , and its nuclear deterrent was tested. As head of state
, Musharraf demonstrated his statesman like qualities by adopting
a pragmatic response to
international scrutiny and to military crisis with India. And when the A.Q.
Khan crisis struck , he carefully balanced
domestic and international
concerns. For Pakistan , these
experiences were in first steps along a
steep learning curve in an
increasingly complex world.7 Decades of experience in nuclear diplomacy are useful
but not sufficient for the
self-declared nuclear power to tackle the nuances of international relations.
The
purpose of possessing nuclear weapons
for deterrence against a conventional attack was established , but what constitutes deterrence
success or failure was not easy
to determine. The knowledge that a bomb exists
in the basement was not
sufficient for India to give up plans for fighting and winning a conventional war. Furthermore Pakistanis recognize that deterrence works primarily in the eye of
the beholder , and as a political weapon , nuclear weapons can be credible only
once they are perceived as militarily
usable. For over a decade now, after three major crises,
Pakistan’s National Command
Authority has matured in formulating strategic
doctrines , thresholds, targeting , and survivability plans.
Pakistan
‘s delivery means were expanded and diversified , including in the arena
of cruise missiles, which have recently been tested. The auxiliary
assertions about the role of nuclear weapons , however, are still in
flux. Until the end of the first
decade after the nuclear tests , there
has been little focus on influential
factors such as the political status of becoming a nuclear power
, especially in terms of regional and international affairs. That might change
in the coming decade , especially after India
is conferred with special status in the nuclear world order and Pakistan is made an outlier.
A Nuclear Pakistan : tale of Two
Futures: What role nuclear
weapons will likely play in Pakistani policies and in its
regional and international engagements will depend primarily on four developments : 1- how the
war on terrorism proceeds and what role
Pakistan will play in it; 2- how regional dynamics
affect conflict resolution and regional power balance between India and Pakistan; 3- How the United States acts in Asia and toward the Islamic world
particularly Iran; 4- how Pakistan’s own
domestic politics progress under, or after, military rule. Depending on these
developments , Pakistan’s nuclear policy is likely to evolve
into one or two futures.
The
first future is moderate and
pragmatic and would occur if Pakistan has a
moderate government that
ensures balanced civil-military relations . This course would perpetuate the national security establishment’s perception of nuclear force as purely
a national security instrument. Even with the changing regional dynamics , it
will likely follow the predictable
pattern that has been seen in the past . Pakistan would continue to rely on a
combination of internal and
external balancing techniques to meet
emerging threats. Pakistani nuclear and conventional forces would grown in tandem with India’s
force modernization . Its external
balancing would likely rely on China ,
Muslim countries , and the United States . If Pakistan ‘s economy grows and if relations with India
improve, the probability of Cold War –style nuclear learning , to
include arms control and confidence
building measures with India , should
not be ruled out.
The
other nuclear future is a radical shift
away from Pakistan’s
traditional approach to international relations.
Such an outcome is more
likely if a radical right-wing government assumes power. A domestic change of this nature could shift
the emphasis of nuclear weapons from a
purely national security tool to
a more ideologically based power
instrument . This would result in confrontation , most likely with Pakistan’s non –Muslim neighbor and the West , and perhaps extended deterrence to the Muslim world. This scenario is
plausible since right-wing political parties
have hinted to this effect.
However, this future would
complicate Pakistan’s relationship with the world
and could put the country’s
nuclear program into jeopardy.
In
sum , Pakistan’s decades-old struggle to
improve its precarious security
predicament has provided
security from its principal adversary
–India. However, as Pakistan becomes
an advanced nuclear state , it
faces asymmetric threats to its
security that require different instruments
of conventional force backed up with political , diplomatic , and economic
efforts.
In
the summer of 2010, the Pakistani nation
was devastated by one of the worst
recorded floods in history .
Nearly one third of the country was submerged
under raging waters , and nearly
two thirds of its prime crops and livestock
were destroyed, displacing nearly 25 million people . Meanwhile , a double digit inflation, poor growth , unemployment , and massive
corruption have brought the country
into a state of “ stagflation” . As the military balances
multiple contingencies and its
nuclear arsenal continues to grow and mature into a deterrent force , the
Pakistani masses seem destined to” eat grass------ even go hungry”. Perhaps
it never crossed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto ‘s
mind that his words would become a
self-fulfilling prophecy.
Dr .I.R. Durrani
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NUCLEAR PAKISTAN AND THE REST OF THE WORLD!!!