"PUNISHING PAKISTAN"

PUNISHING PAKISTAN:

By the mid 1970s, Prime Minister Bhutto was at the peak of his power, but he was quickly losing political allies as well as the patience  of his colleagues . His fascination with socialist ideals were gone; the founding members  of Pakistan’s People’s Party (PPP) were equally disillusioned . Bhutto  thought that by appeasing Islamists  opponents, he could pragmatism to his politics  and stall his plummeting  popularity. Instead, this strategy led Bhutto down a slippery  slope of concessions from which he never recovered. 

In the spring of 1976 Bhutto handpicked  a new army chief, Zia ul Haq, whose appointment  superseded  the rank of many senior generals. . It is not known whom the retiring  Army Chief  Tikka Khan  recommended  as his successor , but apparently  Prime Minister  Zulfi Bhutto  was smitten  with Lieutenant General Zia ul Haq’s  sycophancy.  In particular , the impressive  reception  that Zia  had arranged  when Bhutto  visited the Multan garrison  in 1975  certainly  must have earned  him partiality . Breaking  military  tradition  , Zia ul Haq, corps commander  in Multan , had ordered  officers and families to line up on the streets and give a rousing  welcome to the beloved leader.

Bhutto’s  decision  to appoint  Zia –ul- Haq changed  the fate  of the country  and raises  several questions: Had  Bhutto examined  the military dossiers  of all senior generals  before making his final selection ?¹  If so,  how could  Bhutto have ignored  some concerning traits  of Zia –ul-Haq’s military  career , all of were recorded in his dossier ? Did Bhutto  deliberately  select a  military leader believing him to be a sycophant   that would keep the military subservient  and his control?

General Zia ul Haq’s Islamic  bent  and his adventurous  character  were evident  in his reputation , and even his military record  foreshadowed his impact on the course of history.²  In 1970, then brigadier  Zia ul Haq was posted  to Jordan  as King Hussein’s military advisor and subsequently  played a controversial role in military  operations against  the Palestinian uprising  , famously  known as “ Black September.” Zia allegedly exceeded  his advisory capacity  by actively directing  military operations. The uprising was crushed , but Zia’s  conduct  came under scrutiny , especially  by the Pakistani embassy . Brigadier  Zia ul Haq  did not enjoy amicable relations  with the Pakistani  ambassador  to Jordon  , and the two had often clashed  over mundane  administrative  issues. Eventually , Zia –ul- Haq’s reporting  officer  in  Jordon,  Major  General Nawazish  , gave him an “  adverse report” , which  should have ended  his military career.³   But Zia challenged the report. His plea was accepted , and shortly thereafter  , he was promoted to the rank of Major General  and assigned to the prestigious command of the 1 Armored Division Multan.

Friction soon developed  between Zia ul Haq and his immediate superior ---Corps  Commander  Lieutenant General  Muhammad Sharif.  Writing the annual confidential report (ACR)  of Major General  Zia ul Haq , the corps commander observed Zia tendency  to bypass the chain of command.  This comment was very similar  to what the Pakistani embassy in Amman  had reported earlier. Army Chief Tikka Khan  supported  the corps  commander’s  assessment  and wrote I his remarks “ the general officer  must adhere  to the advice  of his corps commander.” ⁴   Once again,  however, Zia  career advancement  was not  adversely affected , as he was later promoted  to the rank ofa  three star  general replacing Sharif as corps commander  in Multan. Zia ul Haq’s professional military record was impressive , and his conservative nature  and religious convictions were never obstacles;  rather, they were assets to Yahya Khan’s  military regime  , which had a reputation  for drunkenness  and debauchery  that was blamed in part for the 1971 disaster . In all probability  his conservative background  and straightforward professional record overshadowed  some of his less desirable traits.

Thus , Prime Minister  Bhutto  was likely oblivious  to Zia’s negative traits when he made him  the army  chief. He promoted both Muhammad Sharif and Zia ul Haq  to the rank  of four star general  and appointed the two rivals to the positions of Chairman  Joint  Chiefs  of Staff Committee (CJSC)  and Chief of the Army Staff ( COAS), respectively. It is the author’s view  that there is only one plausible explanation  for Zia’s promotion---to explot the cleavage  between the two senior commanders. Bhutto made a Machiavellian move to keep the two men focused  on each other  and thus keep the military away from the domain of civilian  power. And as usual , the sycophant Zia continued to publicly praise the prime minister in a manner and with an eloquence that boosted Bhutto’s ego. ⁵

Bhutto was acutely conscious of the need to modernize the armed forces. In February 1975, he successfully negotiated  with President Gerald Ford  to lift  the decade  -old U.S. arms  embargo, and Pakistan  became the recipient  of the U.S.  equipment  of helicopters  once again.  While the military  was fully supported  for force  modernization , the nuclear question was still a point of contention  and debate.

Bhutto’s Focus on the Nuclear Program : After India’s nuclear test , Bhutto set the nuclear weapons program  into high gear , and from  1974 onward  it was the highest national  security  priority . However , the program  needed oversight  in order  to efficiently handle diplomacy , procurement , finances  and many other issues for which Bhutto had little time. He nevertheless  continued  to be the ultimate decision maker  for the program. Eventually Bhutto established  an inter-ministerial  coordinating committee  to undertake the tasks listed above , as well as to generally  smooth over any bumps in the nuclear program.

In the remaining three years  of Bhutto’s tenure , Pakistan  pursued all options  to bring the nuclear fuel cycle  to its logical  conclusion, which would open up the prospects  for both  a military  weapons program  and a civilian  program for nuclear energy. Bhutto realized  that after the India nuclear test , the international  community  would act quickly  to close  the window  of opportunity for the procurement  of technical capability . In spite of the inter—ministerial  coordinating  committee, the nuclear program  continued to face difficulties  in diplomacy , financing  and technical capacity. Ultimately , Bhutto did  see the nuclear fuel cycle’s  completion  during his time in office  , and he blamed  the United States for his lack of progress.

The prime minister  correctly anticipated  that time was at a premium  and Pakistani  efforts  would meet many obstacles. The United States  also correctly read  Bhutto’s intentions , especially  after the Indian nuclear test . Islamabad, however,  expected the United States to understand Pakistan’s strategic  anxiety  after the test  and was disappointed when , instead  of penalizing  India, the United States was eyeing  Pakistan’s procurement  activities, while also dissuading  Western allies  from nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. Pakistan ‘s strategy was to keep its procurement  activities  within the limits  of commercial law of the country  and if necessary , operate within the legal grey areas. When individuals were caught , Pakistan would at times  officially deny U.S. allegations and disassociate  itself  from illegal  activities. At other times it would privately  explain to the United States that it had to do what  was  in its national interest. Pakistan  would then use diplomacy to mitigate  the damage,  especially  during te critical periods  of the Cold War  when Pakistan’s  role was strategically  significant  to U.S.  security objectives . This cat –and –mouse  game of sorts  would last for three decades.⁶ 

Canada and Germany had followed America’s lead  by refusing to supply  a nuclear  fuel fabrication  plant and a  heavy water production  plant, respectively. The Unite Sates  them mounted  pressure  on France  to abrogate  its agreement  to supply  a commercial  fuel reprocessing  plant . Give this trend , Pakistan  thought  that to avoid  conflict, it had to stay ahead of the game.

To gain France’s trust , Pakistan  agreed to all conductions posed by the foreign supplier : the PAEC was ready and willing to accept  all conditions  for imported plants  and equipment , to place facilities  under IAEA  safeguards, and to  meet any other legal obligations  demanded  by the exporting country. Pakistan’s policy  at the time was to acquire  nuclear capabilities  without  violating international law,  hurting  its diplomatic posture, or jeopardizing  the PAEC’s good standing with the IAEA. Further, the country  could not afford  to imperil  its political  and economic  support from international  organizations, as Bhutto ‘s economic policies had all but crippled the economy.

Pakistani officials  would later point out  that, unlike  India, Pakistan  did not violate  any international safeguards agreements and always abided  by foreign contracts . However, their  concerns and pleas  fell on deaf years. From the Western perspective , India’s test was a fait accompli, and the real concern  was the cascading  effects of horizontal  proliferation. Pakistan  was an obvious state of focus . A non member  of the NPT and known to be in strategic rivalry with India , Pakistan  would certainly react  in some way  to India’s provocation ; thus, even peaceful  acquisition  of nuclear technologies  would have military intentions. Rather tragically  for Pakistan , the more it advertised  its anguish  and security predicaments  to the world, the more supporters it lost. Pakistan was on  its own  to end off  its troubles with India.

In December 1976, Canada  abruptly cut off all supplies , including  nuclear fuel, heavy water , spare parts  , and technical support for KANUPP, PAEC scientists revealed that sudden withdrawal of  personnel  had endangered the safety of the power plant. The Pakistani  diplomatic  and scientific  communities  were now incensed  that Canada,  although it had reasons  to be upset  with India’s actions, was projecting  its anger  onto Pakistan . Clearly , when Pakistan  turned to China for help on the safety  of KANUPP, China was not only sympathetic ; it had other incentives ---especially  an opportunity  to examine  a Western –made power reactor.

Under the populist  leadership  of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto , public support  for the nuclear program  had developed quickly . Government rhetoric  about injustice , discrimination , and unfair treatment  of Pakistan  gained popular appeal  and bolstered the “ never again” theme. The government line also sparked  widespread   belief  that te West was determined  to prevent a Muslim country  from acquiring a nuclear capability. This perception, coupled  with Pakistani  security predicaments , exacerbated  the national sense  of isolation. By the mid 1970s , Bhutto had lost faith in his alliance  with the Wst  and directed  his foreign policy  to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)  and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) . Bhutto  openly championed  the causes  of the Third World , the north-south , divide , and Islam.

In addition , the prime minister’s socialist leanings  led him to search  for stronger friendships in the East. His overtures to China  and North Korea  to acquire  conventional defense  and strategic organizations of the three countries into business  with each other. ⁷  Pakistani scientists  quickly adopted  reverse engineering  techniques  and new methods  of technical  substitution . Bhutto was confident  that his Western trained Ph. D.s  in science  and technology  would be capable of mastering  these arts , thus allowing them to copy  and customize  new technologies. ⁸  However, reverse engineering was not always possible as France’s reprocessing plant forbade copying or reproducing designs.

On April 4,1979 , Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto , the political father of the Pakistani bomb , was hanged. Just two days later, on April 6, the Carter administration  applied the Symington Law to Pakistan  and suspended aid. ⁹  Although  there was  no direct  causal  relationship  between the U.S. sanctions  and Bhutto ‘s death , some theorize  that Zia ul Haq’s disregard  for President  Carter’s  appeal  for clemency  may have triggered  Washington’s anger. ¹⁰   If the Symington  law was intended to punish Pakistan , it only bolstered  Pakistan’s determination  to pursue its nuclear program.

Pursuit of the French Reprocessing Plant: Munir Ahmed Khan , Chairman PAEC  had spent thirteen years in the IAEA  in the Nuclear Power and Reactor Division  and had many friends  and contacts in Europe. He had a  keen understanding  of power reactor  and reprocessing technologies  and was well aware  of France’s pioneering  role  in reprocessing  and plutonium  extraction. After his appointment  as PAEC chair , Munir returned  to Vienna  to officially  end his  employment  with the IAEA. There he met  a French delegate  to discuss  the possible sale of a reprocessing  plant to Pakistan . ¹¹ 

France was eager to make profits  from nuclear commerce  with developing  countries. ¹² Pakistan was just as  enthusiastic  to tap  into French  source , as it would contribute  to reprocessing  know-how and help train  Pakistani scientists  in the back end  of the fuel cycle.  Other Western countries  , such as West Germany and Italy , were also willing to share  reprocessing technologies , as they had with Brazil. ¹³  However , since France  was not a signatory  to the NPT at the time, the PAEC concluded  that the country  might not feel  overly obligated  to insist  on stringent conditions or safeguards. ¹⁴ 

French firm Saint –Gobain Technique Nouvelle ( SGN)  specialized  in spent  fuel reprocessing  and plutonium  extraction  through the solvent extraction method. ¹⁵

The purchase plans  for a  reprocessing plant  were “ on the drawing board”  in the late 1960s , and even then SGN was a  willing partner. ¹⁶  Indeed a Planning Commission  report cites  the approval  of the Executive  Committee  of the National Economic  Council ( ECNEC)  for the purchase of reprocessing plants , a fuel fabrication  facility  for KANUPP, a thirteen –ton per  annum  heavy  water plant  for Multan , and a plutonium  extraction plant. ¹⁷

In Pakistan’s initial talks  with SGN  after 1972 the reprocessing  plant  under consideration  was modest , boasting  only a thirty-ton capacity. During negotiations  , however,  SGN suggested  a plant  with a capacity  of one hundred tons  of reactor fuel , as it was cost-effective  at only a marginal  difference in price. Since Pakistan’s long term  plans  would require  a larger plant , Pakistan agreed , and the two parties  began to discuss  whether the transfer should be on a  turnkey basis or whether  SGN  should design  the plant  and Pakistan’s  construct  it. Finally , they settled on the next option. ¹⁸

Two separate agreements  were signed  by the PAEC  and SGN  to build  an industrial –scale  reprocessing plant  at Chashma  , in the Punjab Province. The first contract  , signed in march 1973 , was for the basic design  of the plant;  the second , signed  on October 18,1974, called for a “ Detailed design”  and the plant’s construction . In the latter contract , SGN  promised  to provide  blueprints , designs, and  specifications; procedure equipment   from suppliers ; and put the plant into operation.  In exchange, SGN would earn $10 million, and other French  contractors  would earn upward of $45 million . France  was also trying  to secure more orders—at least  three to four 600- MW power reactors , Mirage fighter- bombers , and other hardware  for Pakistan and other Arab states. ¹⁹   

French  experts  raised  questions  about the economic  and industrial  justification  for a reprocessing plant  with a capacity  of one hundred tons  per year  in Pakistan . In response , the PAEC  presented France  with the October 1973 IAEA report  justifying the construction of twenty—four  nuclear power reactors  in Pakistan  by the end of the century. However,  the IAEA  plan came under  criticism , especially after the Indian  nuclear test , because  of doubts regarding  Pakistan ‘s true intentions. ²⁰ It remains  uncertain whether the plan  to build  twenty –four  power reactors was a ruse  to justify  the ongoing  purchase of a one hundred  -ton reprocessing plant, or vice versa. ²¹ PAEC’s  excessive  energies  devoted  to the purchase of the reprocessing plant was raising doubts  about its use for peaceful purposes.  Nevertheless , from a technical standpoint, the reprocessing  plant would have yielded  enough  fuel to reduce  Pakistan’s dependence on the scarce  uranium  reserves and increase the country’s self sufficiency. ²²

After India’s 1974 nuclear  test, France insisted that reprocessing  plant be placed  under IAEA safeguards. ²³ Although  displeased , Pakistan decided not to  cause a  confrontation  and agreed  to the new to the new demand , referring the French  request  to the IAEA Board of Governors. Finally the sale was approved in 1976, and in the following  month Pakistan  and the IAEA reached an agreement. The Chashma  reprocessing  facility would now be under full IAEA inspection  and safeguards , and Pakistan  pledged  not to divert  the materials for nuclear weapons  manufacturing  or any other  military purpose. ²⁴

As both  negotiations  for IAEA safeguards and SGN  designs  were in progress , the French began  to shift their position , expressing  concern  that once Pakistan  had obtained  the detailed  design , there would be little need for outside help  to construct it indigenously . ²⁵  The French began  to offer  a variety  of options  intended to let the purchase pass , while enduring  the facility’s peaceful purpose. A new design for the plant  was offered to Pakistan , whose end product  would be mixed –oxide fuel rather than plutonium. Munir Khan tried  to reason with his  French  counterparts  that Pakistan  had no intention  of acquiring or building  breeder reactors; hence mixed—oxide  fuel  would be of no utility . Foreign Secretary  Agha Shahi  formally rejected  the modified  French proposal , insisting that Pakistan had met all of its obligations and agreed  to IAEA safeguards, and thus would not accept  any modifications to the original  agreement. ²⁶ 

Given this setback , Pakistan’s leadership  assessed  that the SGN deal  would  never go through  . Soon Islamabad  began to believe  that Western powers  had accepted  India’s  de-facto  entrance into the nuclear club , but were determined  to block Pakistan  by every possible means. It was obvious  that France was acting under immense pressure from the United States , and by that time, Kissinger  was directly  pressuring Bhutto , with carrots and sticks , to stop his pursuit of a nuclear program.

If Bhutto had planned  to continue  to press France  on the deal  as  strategy  to protect  the secret highly enriched  uranium (HEU) , Pakistani diplomats  abroad  were seemingly  not in sync with this national strategy. Several gaffes were made , but fortunately Pakistan got away with it.

The Chashma reprocessing plant  provoked  much controversy , both in Pakistan  and abroad.  Critics  at home  questioned the utility  of the reprocessing  facility  for the nuclear weapons program , as it was under the full scope IAEA safeguards, while others  outside Pakistan  expressed  doubts  about the efficacy of those very same safeguards. Another  contentious  issue was that the 137 MW KANUPP , also under  IAEA safeguards, was the only source  of irradiated of spent  nuclear fuel  for Chashma reprocessing. This point raised the question of whether , should the reprocessing plant  be acquired , the PAEC  would then violate international safeguards on KANUPP  and divert the spent fuel  for reprocessing at Chashma.

Theoretically , this scenario  was possible  . KANNUP ‘s spent fuel , if and when reprocessed , could yield  enough plutonium  for a few weapons.  According  to a 1978 CIA analysis , KANUPP  could produce between 132 and 264 pounds of reactor grade  or weapon-grade  plutonium, depending  on how the reactor was optimized  for operation. ²⁷   But IAEA safeguard was far too stringent  , making diversion  extremely  difficult.

Ultimately , Pakistan’s plans to acquire plutonium  took another path. PAEC planned to indigenously build a 50-70 MW NRX –type reactor, which would be outside the scope of any safeguards, but the project was shelved  because of a shortage  of labor  and finances. 

New Labs: Indigenous Plutonium Extraction: As negotiations  with France continued  for the commercial  reprocessing  plant, the PAEC secretly commenced work on a  pilot-scale  reprocessing  facility.  This plant was one—tenth the size  of the Chashma plant and once completed , would produce  enough weapon grade  plutonium  for one  to three bombs  per year. ²⁸ Located  near PINSTECH , this small plant was known as “ New Labs.” ²⁹

The primary objective of New Labs was to train PAEC scientists  and engineers  in the sensitive  field of reprocessing . The same trained  personnel  could then be hired  to work  on the larger  commercial reprocessing plant  being built in Chashma . Upon completion , New Labs  had the capacity to reprocess 10-20 kg of spent reactor fuel  annually , and the plutonium  obtained  was sufficient  for at least  two to four atomic bombs each year.

NUCLEAR WALTZING: BHUTTO AND KISSINGER: Within three months  of India’s nuclear tests, President Richard Nixon  resigned. Pakistan had truly lost a friend. At this time , the Pakistani economy was in dire straits  following a poor wheat crop . Bhutto was  requesting  food aid  while simultaneously expanding the nuclear program ---seemingly unconscious  that he was delivering  on his  promise of eating grass. It was under such circumstances  that Bhutto and Kissinger entered  into a verbal banter  over Pakistan’s nuclear program. Given Pakistan ‘s difficult  position,  Bhutto approached  the Ford administration  for only two things ---economic  assistance , particularly  food aid , and an end  to arms’ embargo. He made  various indications  to the United States  that if  Pakistan’s  conventional forces  were bolstered , nuclear weapons  might not be necessary.

In February 1975, Bhutto visited Washington , just at the time  when concerns were rising  over Pakistani  nuclear capabilities , particularly  the purchase  of reprocessing fuel. The prime minister was successful and on February 24, Capitol Hill officially removed the arms embargo that had been imposed  on Pakistan  for the past ten years. U.S officials  were no less concerned  about Pakistan’s  purchase  plans  for the French reprocessing plant , which, in their assessment , was far too large  for the fuel requirements  of KANUPP . They quickly concluded that the plant’s  ultimate  purpose was none other  than to supply  the fuel  for a plutonium  weapons program. By the beginning of 1976, the nonproliferation  regime  had begun  to tighten  its export controls because Pakistan as well as other countries , were all engaged in troubling nuclear activities. Leading the way , the United States  embarked  on “ muscular diplomacy”  to derail  suspect programs. ³⁰ In February 1976 Kissinger met Bhutto in New York and suggested  that Pakistan ‘s needs  would be addressed  through alternative means , such as the creation  of an international  fuel processing  facility in Iran.  Needless to say the meeting was deadlocked.

In another attempt  to dissuade  Pakistan  from its nuclear path , Kissinger visited Pakistan  in August 1976. At the same time, U.S. elections were sparking debates , and Democrat Jimmy Carter’s  agenda  specifically  targeted  Kissinger  and his relaxed response  to India’s  nuclear test. Kissinger second trip  to Pakistan was an attempt to remedy his mistakes . He arrived with an offer of 110 A-7 attack bombers  for the Pakistan Air Force in exchange for cancelling the reprocessing plant purchase ; indicating  that Congress would most likely  approve such a deal. And as a stick , he brandished a possible  Democratic victory , hinting that when in power , Carter  would certainly  make an example  of Pakistan. ³¹ Since that meeting , the popular  myth  in Pakistan  has been that  Kissinger  threatened Bhutto  with “ a horrible example” , meant as an ultimatum. Later that year , Jimmy carter  won the U.S. presidential  election , just as Bhutto announced  a Pakistani election  to be held in March 1977.  Upon assuming  the presidency , Carter quickly turned down the Pentagon’s recommendation  to sell the A-7 attack  bombes to Pakistan > In response , Bhutto threatened  to quit CENTO  , claiming  that it discriminated  against Pakistan. Pakistan  did  indeed  leave the treaty  in 1979 and joined the NAM.

But the Pakistani prime minister had to focus  on his domestic  situation , as large protests  against  him began to spread that accused  him  of rigging  the elections. The domestic situation  in Pakistan  continued to deteriorate . Bhutto truly suspected  that the U.S.  had funneled  money to his Islamic opponents , who then  spurred  the protests. Restless, the Pakistani military  led by Zia-ul-Haq  overthrew Bhutto on July 5,1977.  From that day onward U.S.—Pakistani relations  rapidly deteriorated.  

Pakistan was not the only country  in the region  with political upheavals. In India , Mrs. Gandhi’s government  lost the Indian election , and for the first time  in the country’s history,  a new political part , the Janata  Party, came to power. In Iran, trouble was alo brewing  against the shah , who would eventually be overthrown  in 1979. And in Afghanistan  , the Daoud  regime  would face  domestic , tensions that eventually led to the end  of his reign in 1978.

Three months after Zia  took power  in Pakistan , in September 1977, State Department  nuclear specialist  Joseph Nye , Jr. , visited Islamabad  and threatened to cut off economic assistance  if the French  reprocessing plant  purchase succeeded. At that time , Pakistan was receiving  only US$50 million in aid annually, so the new leader had no incentive to agree  and clearly  informed  Nye  that he intended to proceed  with the project.  In response , U.S. nuclear  sanctions  were applied  and only food aid continued. This point was the lowest in the U.S.- Pakistani history.

Around this time , unbeknownst to the United States  as well as the Pakistani  public , Pakistan’s  nuclear elite embarked  on the highly enriched uranium  route to nuclear weapons.  

Dr. I.R. Durrani

P.S. The references embedded in the text will be provided later.

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Posted in arms embargo, carter, Ford, Kissinger HEU route, MA Khan, New labs, Reprocessing plant, ZAB

CONSENSUS FOR PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR TEST!!

Consensus For  Pakistan’s Nuclear Test:

On May 28, 1998, Pakistan  announced the test of five nuclear explosive devices  in the Chagai Hills  in the western province of Baluchistan . A mere seventeen days after neighboring India  had shocked the world  with its  first nuclear tests  since 1974, Pakistan’s  response  came as a surprise  to many observers. Some had doubted  that Pakistan  possessed  the capability  to construct  a nuclear explosive. But even those who thought  that Pakistan could test  a weapon  were astonished by the speed of the Pakistani  reaction. Many  observers  wondered how a poor country  recovering  from catastrophic  wars and national  dismemberment ---and struggling  with national identity crises---could devote its limited state resources  to acquiring  such potentially destructive  technology.¹ 

Pakistan’s nuclear program evolved under immensely  complex  and challenging  security  circumstances.  Structural generalizations  do not explain the complexities  of its historical  existence  and evolution  unless a holistic account  is understood. This  chapter  examines  that historical  experience ---a blend of cultural  nuances , idiosyncrasies of personalities , and the multitudinous  pulls of domestic politics, regional  crises,  and geographical compulsions , as well as technical challenges , global  politics  , and international  barriers  to nuclear materials  and know-how.

Nuclear technology  is now nearing  seven decades of development , but nuclear politics  and technological  determinism  remain the quintessential factors in internationals relations , especially  for developing states. Fascination in mastering  the mystery  of the atom  is as much alive  today as it was  in the early 50s , when many  of the developing world states  broke free  from the yoke of colonialism. Despite  the many decades  of the nuclear  age exposing  the dangers  and blessings  of nuclear energy , atomic weapons are considered  a life-line  for states like Pakistan  and Israel ,” orphan states”  in the international system outside the U.S.  Nuclear umbrella. ²   In this sense , the story of  nuclear Pakistan is sui generis  among  nuclear weapon-capable  states in contemporary times. Although  many of its  compulsions  and rationales  are comparable  to those of  other nuclear  powers  that earlier  decided  to take  the same path, what would cause Pakistan  to fulfill  almost literally its vow to ‘eat grass or go hungry’ in its quest  for the nuclear  weapon? Why and how did Pakistan  stand in defiance of the world to acquire a capability described by Bernard Brodie as the ‘ absolute weapon’? ³

Like the history of Pakistan state, the story of Pakistan’s nuclear program  is one of unwavering resolve and dedication.  Pakistani  senior  officials tapped  into the genius  of young scientists and engineers  and molded them into a motivated cadre of weaponeers. Building  on this reservoir  of talent , the program  outlasted  perennial  political crises  and persisted  despite poor civil-military relations . The young nation’s leaders and scientists  were united  by the fascination with the new  nuclear science and consciously  interwove nuclear  developments  into the broader  narrative  of Pakistani  nationalism. They were unwilling  to allow India’s strategic  developments to go unanswered , and more assiduously the program  was opposed by India and the West , the more precious it  became. It evolved into the most  significant  symbol  of national  determination  and central element of Pakistan’s identity.  

Pakistan’s enduring rivalry  and strategic  competition  with India  turned bitter  over subsequent decades after a series  of wars  and crises. The last major war in 1971  resulted in humiliating military-defeat  and dismemberment  of Pakistan, which simply  reinforced its belief  that its  adversaries  were determined  to destroy  the very existence of the new state. This perception  united the nation  state into a “ never again”  mind-set that found  succor  in the acquisition  of nuclear capability . However , there were twin causes  for its national dismemberment  in 1971—external  aggression  and internal instability. The development  of a nuclear  capability  and robust  command system might  partially address one-half  of the equation –that is, deterrence  against external threat from India. But Pakistan  has so far failed to address the other more  dangerous  half that threatens  national survivability --- domestic dissension and internal conflict . It was Pakistan’s  inability to develop  a viable political system that failed to bring harmony  and nationalism to a religiously homogeneous but ethnically and linguistically  diverse  people . Although  the quest  to acquire  a nuclear weapons  capability  was fundamentally  drawn  from outside threats , East Pakistan’s  geographical separation , with a hostile India  situated  between the two wings  of the country , was a vulnerability waited to be exploited.

Theory and Approach:  Why do states  pursue nuclear weapons , and how do they do so?  What , if anything , is unique  about the  Pakistani case?  The realists ( neorealists)  would suggest that states are concerned  primarily with maximizing  security.⁴ When faced  with external threats  and an unfavorable  distribution  of political , economic , and military  capabilities  with its adversaries, government officials  have two fundamental  options.  They can either bandwagon , by accepting  the dominance of the stronger  state  and relying on it for continued  safety , ors eek to “ balance”  against the power  asymmetry and security  challenge posed by the adversary.  The option to bandwagon  frequently requires  the weaker state to compromise its national sovereignty? ⁵  The second option can be achieved  through the pursuit of alliances( external  balancing) or through the development of  military  capabilities ( internal balancing). ⁶

According to Kenneth Waltz  and Stephen Walt, states usually choose to balance against  the most serious foreign  threats to their  security ; rarely do they bandwagon ---that is , accommodate or appease  the powers making these threats .⁷

Further defense planners generally  prefer  internal  balancing  because it leaves less to chance  and less to the will of others; however, this strategy requires levels  of national determination  and resources  that are beyond  the reach  of most  countries, including  Pakistan . While allies  were crucial  in the pre-nuclear  era to help states  fend off  foreign aggression , realists recognize that nuclear  weaponry  has made internal balancing both more feasible  and more urgent , especially  to states such as Pakistan  that face  security threats from nuclear armed neighbors.

All nuclear weapons  development programs  constitute  a response  to insecurity  and a form of balancing  against  foreign political  or military threats. States  will choose  to build  nuclear bombs  if the pursuit  of other time-honored  policies –such as strengthening  their conventional  military capabilities , acquiring different weapons  of mass destruction , or aligning  with foreign powers ---are either not available  or insufficient to provide the security of the state. ⁸

An alternative explanation by Jacques Hymans surmises  that ideas  produced  by national, cultural  , or individual attributes  and idealist approaches  can explain  much about worldviews, motives , and decision-making  styles of specific state leaders who engage in nuclear proliferation . ⁹

To understand why some countries  pursue nuclear deterrence –and certainly  to understand  how they operationalize  that deterrent ---one must understand  the strategic  culture  of the country in question . The passion and fervor with which Pakistan  acquired  nuclear weapons  are only partially explained  by realism . What is necessary  is to supplement  realism  with more fine grained  predictions  derived from  Pakistan’s  unique strategic culture---“ a collectivity of the beliefs , norms, values , and historical experiences of the dominant  elite in a polity  that influences their understanding  and interpretation of security issues and environment , and shapes their response  to these .”¹⁰ Strategic culture stands as an important  intervening variable  between changes in the material bases of power and state behavior. ¹¹

“ Strategic culture” is a slippery term, which presents challenges  to any study  employing  it.  The definition used in this account , proposed  by respected Pakistani scholar  Hassan Askari- Rizvi, argues  that historical  experiences  have important  explanatory value  in the development of beliefs  and in assessing how a  given state  responds  to a given threat  to national security. ¹²  Strategic  culture  is the mediating  lens  through which national leaders  view reality , which, while not permanent , is slow to change . National elites  are socialized into a strategic culture , and in the process come to share  these beliefs, norm and values. Frequently , strategic  culture  will be a source of constancy  in the midst  of a changing  international environment .

Peter R. Lavoy argues that  Jawaharlal Nehru and Homi Bhabha played the role of “ nuclear mythmakers.” ¹³  Lavoy defined “ nuclear mythmaking “ as an approach  adopted  by national elites ( mythmakers) who want  government  to adopt  a national security strategy of acquiring  nuclear weapons  by emphasizing  the country’s insecurity  and poor international  standing ; portraying  this strategy  as the best corrective  measure; articulating  political, economic,  and technical feasibility ; successfully  associating  these beliefs with existing cultural norms  and political priorities; and finally  convincing national decision –makers to act on these views. ¹⁴

Lavoy provides an analytic pathway as to how  myths  turn  into strategic beliefs. He examines  primary  and auxiliary assertions  that drive leaders  to convince decision  -makers and ultimately  create a popular  national goal.

The primary beliefs are based  on two levels  of relationship . The first  level is  the relationship  between nuclear weapons  acquisition  and the military  dimension of security , which lays  the foundation  on which the second  level develops in term of a state’s  political status  and its influence  in international affairs. These levels are supplemented  by four auxiliary  requirements , which relate to articulating  political , economic , strategic , and technological feasibilities.  The state must have the developed  capacity  to manage  political problems associated  with developing  nuclear weapons and their impact on relations with important states ; the wherewithal to meet financial costs  associated  with acquisition  or development  of nuclear technology , including  the possibility for other spin –offs  such as industry , agriculture , and medicine ; the capability to develop operational  nuclear weapons and to devise options for their effective use in military  operations; and the infrastructure  and capacity to  overcome the numerous technical difficulties  associated  with developing  nuclear weapons with the possibility for industrial spin offs. When leaders  acquire  the capability  to articulate the six  interrelated factors  with panache  and convincing aplomb , it is a matter  of time  for them  to become embedded  in the strategic  culture  of the nation state. ¹⁵

The person who spear headed  the idea of nuclear Pakistan  was Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. In Pakistan ‘s early history there was no consensus  about the desirability  or utility of nuclear weapons . Only a few individuals, most  notably  Bhutto , believed that acquiring them was critical for Pakistan . However,  following the devastating loss of East Pakistan  in 1971 and the Indian nuclear test  in 1974, opinions favoring  nuclear weapons , held only by a minority , became national consensus ---the necessity of nuclear weapons became a mainstream belief. This belief  eventually determined  the discourse  of Pakistan nuclear thinking  that evolved gradually ---first into developing  a nuclear weapon  capability  that took some twenty-five years , and later  operationalizing it after being forced  to demonstrate that capability.

In the Indian case , the shock of losing  the 1962 war with China combined with the Chinese  nuclear test at Lop Nor  in 1964 eventually led to the Indian test in 1974. ¹⁶   Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru ‘s and Indian  Chief Scientist Homi Bhabha’s  arguments  became  dominant  , even though  neither  survived  to see the ascendancy  of those beliefs.  In the Pakistan  case, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto played a similar role  and nurtured the nuclear program throughout the important decade of the 1970s.

Today, there are three important  strategic beliefs  regarding nuclear weapons  that were largely absent when Bhutto took power  in 1971 but have since become  dominant  in Pakistani strategic  thought. First , nuclear weapons are the only guarantee of Pakistan’s national  survival  in the face of both  an inveterately  hostile India that cannot be deterred  conventionally  and unreliable external allies that fail  to deliver in the extremis.  Second, Pakistan ‘s nuclear program  is unfairly singled  out the international opposition because of its Muslim population.  This feeling of victimization  is accentuated  by a belief  that India  consistently “ gets away with “  violating global nonproliferation  norms. Third is the belief that India, Israel , or the United States  might use military  force  to stop Pakistan’s nuclear program. Today, these three beliefs --- nuclear  necessity for survival , international discrimination  against Pakistan , and danger of disarming attacks---form the centre of Pakistani strategic  thinking about nuclear weapons . Collectively these convictions have served  to reinforce  the determination  of Pakistan’s military , bureaucratic , and scientific establishment  to pay  and political, economic, or technical cost to reach their objective  of nuclear armed Pakistan. 

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was able to capture this all –encompassing narrative even before there was any national consensus on nuclear matters. He continued to push for nuclear developments  as foreign minister  in the 1960s and played  a critical  role during the period as national leader in the 1970s . By the time he was removed from power in 1977, his thinking on nuclear matters  had been institutionalized  throughout the establishment . Ample patrons in the military , bureaucracy  , and scientific  communities would ensure  the nuclear program’s success in the 1980s and 1990s. Today the national narrative around  the need for nuclear  weapons is intertwined with Pakistani nationalism to a  level that it I almost treasonous to think otherwise.

Nuclear Themes : While it is too strong a statement to say that every nuclear state has the same historical experience , it is useful to highlight the similarities. Underneath  the unique  strategic  beliefs of Pakistan  are several themes  that similar to those  found in the histories  of other nuclear aspirants. Three threads  interweave through the fabric  of many nuclear weapons  acquisition  stories : national humiliation , international isolation , and national identity . When Pakistanis  look  back on their history , these themes  are recurrent  and provide  a conceptual  foundation  from which  specific strategic belief s emerge.

National Humiliation : At the core of the nuclear weapons  acquisition  narrative  rests national humiliation---the phrase “ never again” is repeated  over and over  in nuclear histories. For many nations , fears produced  by past humiliations are frequently reinforced  by concerns about nuclear blackmail. The Soviet Union after experiences  the ravages  of invading  Nazi armies , refused to accept  the danger that came from an American nuclear monopoly. ¹⁷   China’s nuclear ambitions  were fueled  by a century of  foreign interference , a brutal Japanese occupation , and U.S. nuclear threats in the 1950s. ¹⁸ India’s national humiliation stemmed  from colonial subjugation , an embarrassing  defeat in its border war with China in 1962, and the strategic disparity following the Chinese nuclear test  at Lop Nor in 1964. ¹⁹ Israel is a state created to ensure that “ never again”  would the Jewish people face risk  of national extermination , and nuclear  weapons  became perceived increasingly  as central to that requirement in the context of enduring Arab-Israeli enmity .²⁰

For Pakistan, the memories –both first hand  and passed down – of the fall  of Dacca , the loss of East Pakistan,  and the capture of ninety thousand  prisoners of war  by India are seared  into collective memory. The tragedies of 1971 left Pakistan reeling  , and were followed by the subsequent blow  of the 1974 Indian nuclear test. Together , these events  allowed nuclear enthusiasts to take charge and led  to the ascendance  of Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto   and his belief in the necessity  of nuclear arms . Nuclear weapon efforts were redoubled  after India’s  underground  explosion at Pokhran three years later . The asymmetry  is strategic  capability  between India and Pakistan  reinforced  the feeling of insecurity that had lingered  after  Dhaka’s fall.  The Pakistani nuclear weapons program was the only way  to prevent such humiliation  in the future  and to preserve Pakistan. “ Never again”  would Pakistan be subject  to disgrace  at the hands of others.

International Isolation:        Some nuclear weapon states find themselves  on the receiving end  of international  demonization , which serves  only to buttress national resolve  to develop advanced  technology . While the Russian  experience  was somewhat  different –it is  difficult  to call nascent  superpower  isolated---the USSR was the target  of Western  castigation  for its socialist  way of life . Nuclear weapons were not only  a security  imperative  but also proof  to the West  of Soviet  scientific advancement.  China  found itself  ideologically  disconnect  not just  from Western foes but also,  and increasingly , from its former Soviet patrons. Israel  faced opprobrium  from much  of the postcolonial  world, and criticisms grew as Soviet –backed  pan-Arabism  emerged  as an important  political force in the 1950s.  

 Many nuclear aspirants  are also harshly  reminded  that to the extent that they have international support , such support  is insufficient  or , more often , ephemeral during periods of profound  political crisis . Israel’s  early history  showed that the United Sates  would subordinate  Israel’s interest during periods of tension  in an attempt  to maintain stability  between the superpowers. Israel’s battlefield  successes in 1947-48 and 1967 occurred with little  foreign support . Soviet backing did little  to ease  Chinese hardships in Korea or to face U.S.  threats in other crises regarding Taiwan in 1955.  Tensions between Soviet President  Nikita Khrushchev and Chinese communist leader Mao Zedong grew in the mid -1950s , ultimately  leading to the cessation  of Soviet assistance  to the Chinese nuclear program  in 1959. India found itself isolated  : it initially  received  neither U.S.  nor Soviet  assistance  in 1962 war with China . Delhi’s calculations  had gone woefully wrong  when its forward policy  on the disputed  territory provoked a border war  with China . But, unfortunately  for India , it occurred simultaneously  with the Cuban Missile Crisis  between the two Cold War super –powers.  Following China’s  nuclear test  in 1964, India’s hawks  began to dominate the debate. The mood of the nation  was summed  up in a famous  speech of renowned  Indian scientist Homi Bhabha :” [A]tomic  weapons  give a state  possessing  them in adequate  numbers  a deterrent power  against  attack  from a much stronger State.” ²¹ Eventually  the bomb lobby  in India  would prevail , while India continued to believe  it was on its own . In 1965, India was disgusted that United States  had cut off  aid to both India and Pakistan , despite Delhi’s  belief  that Pakistan  was aggressor  in the five-week long Second Kashmir War.

For Pakistanis, history showed that outsiders would  not assist them in confronting  security threats, particularly during the periods of most pressing need. Pakistan’s alliance  with the United States  provided  no benefit in the 1965 war and proved  traumatically  insufficient  to stop military defeat  in East Pakistan in 1971. While  Pakistan  entered into an alliance  with the United States primarily to answer the Indian threat , the United States  viewed the alliance  solely through  the prism  of super power competition  and had little interest  in Pakistan’s fears  about India . Similarly , Pakistan’s all-weather  friendship  with China translated  into little material  support  for Pakistan  when it counted  most,  in either  the 1965or 1971 wars. After Pakistan  embarked seriously  on the nuclear path  , it increasingly was the focus  of Western proliferation  concerns.  Conspiracy  theories  that Pakistan was being targeted  for its “Muslimness” grew, along with the resentment . This perception of international  isolation  only served to reinforced the Pakistani  state’s devotion  to achieving  nuclear self-sufficiency.

National Identity:   Most nuclear programs  are not initiated  with national identity  as a driving factor , but often they eventually become integral to national  self-perception  and are thus perpetuated  by their symbolic  place in national identity . Sacrifices  associated  with the nuclear program  made in the face  of international  opposition , combined with the belief  that nuclear weapons are the only answer to prevent future humiliation , confer  symbolic  meaning  upon the nation’s sense  of self.  By 1971, all five permanent members of the UN Security Council  were recognized  as nuclear weapon states  by the Treaty  on the Non –proliferation  of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) , and nuclear weapons  were perceived  as the currency of international power. Moreover , the scientific, technical  , and logistical  challenge  of nuclear development elicits pride  in societies  that are able to harness  their national potential  to join what is  arguably the most elite club in the world . A.Q. Khan boasted of Pakistan’s  success in uranium  enrichment :” A country which could not  make sewing needles  , good bicycles  or even ordinary  durable  metalled roads  was embarking  on one of the latest and most difficult technologies.” ²²  

Pakistan ‘s sense of national identity  has a  complex relationship  with its Islamic identity . The perception  that Pakistan is a victim  of discrimination –that  the world  is opposed  uniquely  to an “ Islamic bomb” ---became a  source  of pride. Of the Muslim polities , only Pakistan has managed  to cross the  nuclear threshold . This  nuclear accomplishment gave Pakistan a certain preeminence  in the Islamic world. It is , perhaps, no surprise then , that Zuliqar Ali Bhutto , the force behind  the nuclear program , pivoted Pakistani foreign policy to enhance  ties to other Muslim countries. Moreover , Bhutto  adroitly leveraged these relationships  to garner financial support for Pakistan’s nuclear program . Such  global prominence , in Pakistan  thought, harkened back to past civilizational glory, to the time when the Mughal Empire shared the global stage  with the Safavids and the Ottomans. Additionally , for Pakistan , a country conflicted over whether it is a secular  or theological Muslim state, nuclear weapons were a symbol of cohesion ---they became  one of the few issues  about which there was  national consensus.

Dr. I.R Durrani

PS. The references embedded in the text will be provided later. 

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Posted in consensus, Dacca Debacle, Islamic bomb, Pakistan bifurcates, The search for nuclear deterrence, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto(ZAB)

Nukes sans Nations--How terrorists can make a bomb!!

NUKES WITHOUT NATIONS:

From a lofty view there is justice in the world where the weak  become stronger , and the strong have no choice  but to accommodate  the gain. Practically speaking , however, the poor , the poor , for a host  of reasons , are more likely to use  their nuclear weapons than the great powers  have been , at least since the United  States terrorized Japan . At the extreme  is the possibility , entirely  real, that one or two nuclear weapons  will pass  into the hands  of the new stateless guerrillas , the jihadist , who offer none of the retaliatory  targets  that have so far underlain  the nuclear peace---no permanent  infrastructure to protect , no capital  city , and indeed  no country called home.  The danger first arose  in the chaos of the post –Soviet Russia in the 1990s , and it took  full form  after  the September 11 attacks of 2001.  The U.S.  government’s  subsequent  manipulation  of the fear is deplorable  and tragic : far better to accept the risk soberly , and to examine it realistically , than to dash around  making blind wars , limiting  liberties  and commerce, and generally  self-destructing  in advance.  Nonetheless  the fact remains: with so little  to lose  from nuclear retaliation , and it need of ever more dramatic acts  in their war against the West, these jihadists  are the people  who would not hesitate  to detonate a nuclear device.

Of course they may also pursue  their war  in other spectacular  ways,  including  small-scale  bombings , poison-gas  assaults  in enclosed  public spaces, and more difficult  biological  attacks.  Within the nominally  nuclear realm , they may choose  to set off “ dirty bombs,” which would use  conventional  explosives  not to induce a fission reaction , but to scatter ordinary , detectable  radioactive  materials  through a few city blocks , causing public hysteria—all the more so in societies  where  even outdoor  tobacco  smoke is called  a threat . Dirty  bombs  would be mere nuisance bombs  if people  would keep their calm . But of course  people will not. The potential effectiveness  of such a device  was loudly signaled by the clamor  about the dangerous  dust  around  the World Trade Centre  site,  and it was reinforced  more recently  by the outraged  new reaction to an attempt  by a U.S . agency  to raise the acceptable  threshold  of radiation  for reinhabiting  an area after  a dirty-bomb attack. The outrage  must have been  noticed  by the people who  count.  Furthermore they must know  that even  just in the United States there are large  quantities  of nonfissionable  but highly radioactive  materials  contained within machines , primarily in hospitals and at industrial  sites , and that the machines, because  they are expensive , are sometimes  stolen  for resale. In fact in the United States  alone there are hundreds  of thefts  of radioactive  material every year. As to why  no dirty  bomb  has yet been assembled  and used, analysts  provide  earnest explanations, but largely to avoid throwing  up their hands in wonder.

In any event  a true atomic bomb –a fission device  such as the one  that destroyed Hiroshima ---is  an entirely  different weapon, far more difficult to obtain  or build , but hugely  more effective if used.  Beyond the immediate havoc  that would be caused by the blast , the ongoing  reactions  to the 9/11 attacks  offer the merest indication of the massive self-devouring  that would  subsequently  occur. In Western capitals today  there are quiet  people, serious people , who, while recognizing  the low probability  of such an attack , nonetheless worry that the successful use of just a single atomic bomb could bring  the established order to its knees—or lay it out flat.

If you were a terrorist intent on carrying out a nuclear strike , you could not count on acquiring  an existing device. These are held as critical national assets in fortified  facilities  guarded by elite  troops , and  they would  be extremely difficult  to get at, or to buy. Some reports  suggest  the contrary , particularly because  of rumors , about the penetration of organized crime into the Russian nuclear forces, and about portable satchel nukes, or “ suitcase bombs,” which are said  to have been built for the KGB  in the late 1970s and 1980s , and then lost into the global  black market  following  the Soviet  breakup  a few  years later. The existence  of suitcase  bombs has never been proved , however, and there has never been  a single verified case, anywhere , of the theft of any sort of nuclear weapon. Thefts may nevertheless have occurred , particularly during the chaos of the mid-1990s , but nuclear weapons  require regular maintenance , and any of them still lingering on the market today  would likely have now become duds. Conversely, because these time limitations are well-known , the very lack of a terrorist nuclear strike  thus far hints that nothing useful was stolen in the first place . Either way , even if the seller could  provide a functioning device , nuclear weapons  in Russia and other advanced states  are protected by electronic locks that would defeat almost any attempt  to trigger an explosion . Of course you could look to countries  where less rigorous  safe-guards  are in place,  but no government  handles its nuclear arsenal  loosely  or would dare to create  the impression that it is using  surrogates  to fight its nuclear wars. Even the military leaders  of Pakistan , who have repeatedly demonstrated  their willingness  to sell  nuclear weapons  technology  abroad, would balk  at allowing a constructed bomb  to escape—if only  because of the certainty that after the blast , the trail  would be backtracked , and they would be held to account. The same concerns will almost  certainly now constrain  Iran.

If you were a terrorist , all this might give you pause to take your bearings. You would need to distinguish  between your own needs as a stateless  fighter  , and those of conventional governmental proliferators. Even the youngest  nuclear weapon states ---such as Pakistan or North Korea---have little use for just or two bombs . To assume a convincing posture of counterstrike and deterrence , or simply to exhibit nuclear muscle , they require a significant  arsenal that can be renewed and improved and grown across time. This in turn  requires that they build  large scale  industrial  facilities  to produce warhead fuel, which cannot be purchased  in sufficient quantity  on the international black market  to sustain  a nuclear –weapons production  line. Manufacturing  high –quality  fuel is still the most difficult  the most  difficult and important part of any nuclear program. It is something that a stateless group simply cannot do.

But this is not necessarily a  problem. Indeed. Giving up on the manufacture of fuel would largely  remove you  from the reach  of the NPT and other nonproliferation efforts, which  focus  on interrupting the spread of weapons at that stage.   Furthermore , an excess of weapons –ready  fissile material  is already stockpiled  in the world today, of which you require only a small amount. Keep in mind that unlike governments with territory to protect , you can attack  with near impunity  and accomplish  your purposes  with merely  one or two garage –made bombs . Surely you can find a way to buy or steal the necessary fuel.

It would be helpful  at this  early point to consider exactly what kind of fuel to puruse. For ordinary fission bombs , there are really only two choices –either plutonium  or highly enriched uranium . Plutonium is  a man-made element  produced by  uranium reactors, from which it emerges  initially mixed  in with the other  radioactive waste , but is separable  through chemical processes. There are several  forms of it , including one purpose made for bombs. Armies favour  plutonium  because it is highly fissionable and can be made  to go critical  in small quantities, thereby  lending itself to miniaturization  of weapons. Miniaturization  has obvious attractions, but it requires  a  level of engineering  sophistication , related mostly to the efficiency of nuclear chain reactions, that lies beyond  the capabilities  of a small terrorist team. And miniaturization  is not that important  for the purposes at hand.  You can hit New York  or London  well enough  with a car-sized  device locked into  a shipping container  or loaded into a private airplane  behind  a couple of dedicated pilots. Furthermore, ignoring the question  of size , plutonium  has a couple of negatives for an operation such as yours. For technical reasons it is not  suited  for use in a basic  cannon type  bomb  and demands instead  the explosive symmetry  of a Nagasaki –style implosion device. Building  an implosion device  would introduce  complexities  you would be better off avoiding , particularly without a place  and the time to test the design.  And plutonium is difficult to handle --- sufficiently  radioactive  to require shielding , awkward to transport  without setting off  radiation detectors , and extremely dangerous even in minute quantities if it is breathed in, swallowed, or absorbed into the body  through a cut or open wound.  Plenty of people in this world  would willingly die  for the chance  to nuke  the United States, but within the limited pool of technicians who might join your effort , it would be impractical to expect so much . Plutonium might work as the pollutant  spread by a dirty bomb, but for the purposes of a simple fission device , plutonium is out.

The alternative is highly enriched uranium , or HEU , containing more  than 90 percent  of the fissionable  isotope , U-235. Operationally  it is wonderful  stuff—the perfect fuel for a garage made bomb. During processing , it takes the form  of an invisible gas , a liquid, a powder, and finally a  dull gray  metal  that is cool and dry to the touch. It has approximately the toxicity of lead  and would sicken shop workers who swallowed  traces of it  or breathed in its dust , but otherwise  it is not immediately dangerous  and, indeed, is so mildly radioactive  that it can be picked up  with bare hands , transported in a backpack , and when , lightly  shielded  , taken past most radiation  monitors  without setting off alarms. In small masses HEU is so benign that you could  sleep with it  under your pillow  if you so desired . However, you could not  just casually  pile it up. The reason  is that the atoms of U-235 occasionally and spontaneously split apart  , and in doing so  they fire off neutrons, which within a sufficient mass of material  could split enough other atoms to cause a blossoming  chain reaction. Such a reaction  would not amount  to a military style  nuclear explosion , but it could certainly  release  enough energy to take out  a few city blocks.

At low end of HEU , which is considered  to be 20 percent  enrichment , nearly a ton would have to be combined  before a stockpile  could spontaneously  ignite.  At the high end , which is the weapon grade  enrichment of 90 percent  or greater , less than one hundred pounds  could do the trick.

Should a terrorist be able to acquire two bricks of weapon-grade HEU, each weighing fifty pounds: how far apart  would he have to keep them ? A yard would be enough.

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union , the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported seventeen officially  declared cases of trafficking  in plutonium  or HEU , generally Russian made. This is  certainly an undercount , though perhaps by a smaller factor than is usually said. The activity was strongest  in the early and mid 1990s , when it seemed to be directed  toward a half imagined network  of arms dealers  in Central  and Western Europe. The reported incidents  then tapered off  for a few years , but they resumed in 1998 and have continued  intermittently  ever since. At the same time there seems to have  been a  shift  in the smuggling  routes, away  from Western Europe , and across the southern Caucasus into Turkey.    Turkey is world’s grand bazaar , and given its geographic position overlooking the Middle East , it is hardly surprising  that in recent years  people have gone there  looking to sell their nuclear goods.

It turns out that the world  is rich with fresh  , safe, user friendly HEU ---a global accumulation ( outside the world’s collective 30 k  nuclear warheads) that is dispersed among hundreds of sites  and further separated  into nicely  transportable , necessarily  sub critical  packages. The combined HEU amounts to over a thousand metric tons . A thousand metric tons is 2,205,623 pounds. That represents  a lot of fissile material lying around  , when only a hundred pounds are needed. The practical question is how to pick some up. Although almost all HEU  is in some manner  guarded , it might nonetheless  be acquired  in many countries , and probably  nowhere better  than in Russia. The U.S. government reacted rapidly  to a perception of chaos  and opportunity  in post-Soviet  nuclear affairs  and in 1993 launched an ambitious  complex  of “ cooperative” programs  with all the former Soviet  states  to lessen the chance  that nuclear  weapons  might end up in the wrong hands . The programs  have blossomed  into the largest part  of  American aid to Russia , amounting so far  to several billion dollars . There is the unidentified  whiff of a protection  racket here---of U.S.  taxpayers paying off the Russians  to please not frighten them, but by the profligate standards  of government  spending , the money has been well used. These tasks have by now  almost been completed  in the outlying  nations –a success  directly  related  to the abandonment  of nuclear weapons. But of course  the centre of the effort is in Russia , where for exactly  the opposite reason  much work remains to be done.    

  

  

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Posted in black market, HEU, nuclear proliferation, Terrorists, Turkey Russia, weapon grade

THE DEAD HAND!!

THE DEAD HAND:

When Mikhail Gorbachev shook hands for the first time with Ronald Reagan at Geneva on November 19, 1985, the two superpowers  had amassed  about sixty thousand  nuclear warheads.  The arms race  was at its peak .” We looked  at each other  on the threshold , in front of the building where the negotiations were to take place , the first meeting,” Gorbachev  recalled more than two decades later .” Somehow , we extended  a hand to each other , and started talking. He speaks English , I speak Russian, he understands nothing, and I understand nothing. But it seems there is a kind of dialogue  being connected, a dialogue of the eyes.” At the end of the summit, when they shook hands again on a statement that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought , Gorbachev was astonished. “ Can you imagine  what that meant?”” It meant that everything we had been doing was an error.”

“ Both of us knew better  than anyone else  the kind of weapons that we had,” he said.” And those were really piles , mountains of nuclear  weapons.  A war could start not because of a  political decision , but just because of some technical failure.”  Gorbachev  kept a sculpture of a goose  in his Moscow office as a reminder  that a flock of geese  was once briefly mistaken for incoming missiles by the early-warning radars.

At Reykjavik, Gorbachev and Reagan went further toward eliminating  all nuclear weapons than anyone had gone before. But a  generation later , the great promise of Reykjavik remains unfulfilled.  The “ absolute weapon”  is still with us.  While the total number of warheads  has shrunk by about two-thirds, thousands are still poised  for launch. The United States  maintains  at the ready  about 2,200 strategic  nuclear warheads , and 500 smaller , tactical nuclear weapons . Another 2,500 warheads are held in reserve , and an additional  4,200 are awaiting  dismantlement. Russia  still maintains  3,113 warheads  on strategic weapons , 2079 tactical warheads  and more than 8,800 in reserve or awaiting dismantlement . That’s more than 23k  nuclear warheads.

Since the end of the Cold War , the world has changed dramatically . Amorphous  and murky threats ---failed states , terrorism  and proliferation ---have grown more ominous. Nuclear weapons will hardly deter  militias  such as the Taliban , or terrorists  such as those who attacked  New York, Washington , London, Madrid and Mumbai in recent years. The terrorists and militias seek to frighten  and damage  a  more powerful foe. So far they have employed  conventional weapons ---bombs, grenades , assault rifles  and hijacked airlines---but they also want to get their hands  on more potent  weapons  of mass casualty. Driven by intense zeal, they are not intimidated  by a  nuclear arsenal , nor deterred  by fear of death A lone suicidal terrorist carrying anthrax  bacteria  or nerve agents  in a plastic  pouch is not an appropriate target  for a nuclear—armed missile. And while  nuclear weapons  worked  as a reliable  deterrent  for leaders  in the Kremlin  and the White House , two experienced  adversaries , they may not work  so well if one of the protagonists is an untested  nuclear power , nervous and jittery.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union , the United States  twice re-examined  its nuclear weapons policies  and deployment  in formal studies , known as the Nuclear Posture Review . Both  times, in 1994 and 2002, the reviews acknowledged  that the world had changed  after the Cold War , but neither report was followed by radical change.  The main reason  was fear of the future ; nuclear weapons  were needed  as a “ hedge”  against uncertainty . At first , the uncertainty  was the chaos  in the former Soviet Union , and later it was the prospect  of some other nation or terrorist group obtaining nuclear weapons.

But the arsenals of the last  war seem a poor hedge against new threats . Four elder statesmen  of the nuclear age issued  an appeal in 2007 to take action  toward “ a world free of nuclear threat” . They were Sam Nunn , Chairman of the Senate Armed Services  Committee 1987-1994; George  Shultz , Secretary of State 1982-1989; Henry Kissinger , Secretary of State 1973-1977; and William J. Perry , Secretary of Defense  1994-1997. Gorbachev soon joined them . All were intimately  involved  with decisions about the nuclear balance of terror. The time has come to listen to them. ¹   

One of their recommendations is to eliminate the short-range battle-field or tactical nuclear weapons  left over from the Cold War. The United States has five hundred of these weapons  deployed, including two hundred in Europe . They were originally  intended to deter a Warsaw Pact invasion ; the Warsaw Pact is history. Little is known about the disposition  in Russia  of the thousands  of tactical  nuclear weapons removed from Eastern Europe  and te former Soviet republics  after te 1991 Bush-Gorbachev  initiative. They may be in storage  or deployed ; they have never been covered  by any treaty , nor any verification regime, and the loss of just one could be catastrophic.²  

Another step would be to take the remaining  strategic  nuclear weapons off launch-ready alert.  When Satanislav Petrov faced  alarm in 1983,  such decisions  had to made in just minutes . Today , Russia is no longer  the ideological or military threat  the Soviet Union once was; nor the United States pose such a threat to Russia. Americans invested much time and effort to assist Russia’s leap to capitalism in the 1990s---should we aim  our missiles  now at the very stock markets in Moscow  we helped design ? Bruce Blair  has estimated that both the United States and Russia maintain  about one third of their total arsenals on launch –ready alert. It would take one or two minutes to execute the launch codes fire Minuteman missiles in the central plains of the United States , and about twelve minutes  to launch  submarine-based missiles. The combined firepower  that could be unleashed in this time frame by both countries is approximately 2,654 high yield  nuclear warheads , or 100k Hiroshimas. Procedures  could easily be put  in place that would de-alert the missiles and create  deliberate launch  delays of hours, days or weeks  to prevent a terrible mistake And it would be wise for Russia to disconnect  and decommission  Perimeter , the semiautomatic  command  system  for nuclear retaliation. The Doomsday Machine was built for another epoch.³

After these steps , the United States and Russia could begin  working—ideally in a renewed partnership –toward the goal of total , verified elimination of nuclear weapons around the globe . The United States  and Russia together hold 95 percent of world’s warheads. The Moscow Treaty  of 2002, signed by President George W. Bush  and President Vladimir  Putin , called  for between 2,200 and 1700 warheads “ operationally  deployed”  on each side by the year 2012. Neither  nation would suffer from radical reductions from this level . In today’s world , thousands of nuclear warheads on each side do not provide  thousands of times  more deterrence  or safety than a small number of warheads. A drive toward liquidation of the arsenals would be a fitting  way to bury  the Cold War . So would a determined  effort  to halt  the spread  of nuclear weapons and fissile materials elsewhere , as the ratification  of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.  We should remember  the wisdom  of Bernard Brodie, the pioneering early thinker about atomic weapons , who wrote that they are “ truly cosmic forces  harnessed to the machines  of war.”  The war is over. It is long past time to scrap the machines.

In 1992, Senators Nunn and Lugar took a gamble with history . Back then , skeptics  suggested it would  be best  to let the former Soviet Union  drown in its own sorrows---to go into a “ free fall.” Nunn and Lugar  did not agree . They helped  Russia and the other  former  Soviet  republics  cope with an inheritance  from hell. The investment paid  huge dividends . In the years that followed , Kazakhstan , Belarus , and Ukraine  completely abandoned nuclear weapons. A total of 7,514 nuclear warheads, 752 intercontinental  ballistic missiles , and 31 submarines were deactivated.⁴    These were required by arms control treaties , but Nunn –Lugar provided the resources that made  dismantlement a reality.

Many of the facilities  with unguarded fissile material  in the mid—1990s  underwent security up grades . By 2008 , more than 70 percent of the buildings  in the former Soviet Union  with weapons –usable  nuclear materials  had been fortified , although  the uranium  and plutonium  were still spread  across more than two hundred locations.⁵ After Project Sapphire , highly enriched uranium  was removed , often quietly , from an additional nineteen research reactors  and sensitive  installations around the former Soviet bloc.⁶  The International Science and Technology Centre , started after  Baker’s visit to Chelyabinsk -70, made grants over fourteen years that benefited ,at one time or another , about seventy thousand scientists and engines involved  in building weapons.⁷   The anthrax factory at Stepnogorsk  was destroyed , including the giant  fermenters in Building 221. On Vozrozhdeniye Island eleven graves  where anthrax  was buried  were pinpointed; the substance , pink with a texture of wet clay , was excavated  and the pathogens neutralizerd.⁸  On the steppe near Russia’s southern border , a $1 billion factory  has been constructed  that will destroy the huge stockpiles  of chemical weapons , including sarin , stored in the nearby  warehouses. At the Mayak Chemical Combine  in the City of Ozersk , a massive  fortified  vault  was built in the United States  at a cost  of $309 million to store excess  Russian fissile materials . With a walls twenty –three feet thick, the Fissile Material Storage Facility  answered  the need  so starkly  evident  after the Soviet collapse---a Fort Knox to guard  uranium and plutonium.

It was never going to be easy for  a country so turbulent as Russia  to accept  the hand of a rich  and powerful rival , and it wasn’t. Suspicions, delays, misunderstandings  and errors  were abundant  in the years after the Soviet  collapse. ⁹  But overall , given the immense size of the Soviet military—industrial complex  and the sprawling nature  of the dangerous  weapons and materials , the Nunn –Lugar gamble paid off. The world  is safer  for their vision  and determination . It was also a bargain . The yearly  cost for all facets  of Nun n-Lugar  was about $1.4 billion , a tiny sliver of the annual Pentagon  budget of more than $530 billion. ¹⁰

Telling the whole truth about the Sverdlovsk outbreak  would be  a good first step  toward putting the terrible secret history of Biopreparat to rest.

The truth matters . Deception is a tool of germ warriors. The same disguise that concealed  the Soviet biological weapons  program as civilian  research could be used  to hide a dangerous  germ warfare program anywhere.  The anthrax letter attacks in the United States  in 2001, the outbreak of  Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome(SARS) in 2003 and the dramatic  advances in biosciences  have all underscored the destructive nature  of biological agents. The National Academy of Sciences concluded in a report  in 2009 that closed cities like Obolensk  with a relatively large footprint  are no longer necessary to house  an illicit  biological weapons program. A dangerous  pathogen , say  a virus, could be spread  with no discernible  signature.  The workspace  of a  biological  weaponeer  or terrorist could be safely nestled  inside university  or commercial laboratory,  impossible to discover  by satellite reconnaissance . People are the key , as Vladmir  Pasechnik demonstrated  by following his conscience  and revealing Soviet misdeeds . To detect such dangers  in the future requires  human contacts , networks, transparency  and collaboration , the pain staking building of bridges  that Andy Weber pursued.

In the  1990s , Russia seemed vulnerable  and desperate , but starting  in the year 2000, a surge of oil wealth fueled  a new sense of independence . Also Russia was led into another period of authoritarianism  under President Putin , during which it grew hostile to outsiders.  Under Putin, Russia increasingly shut down cooperation with the West on biological weapons proliferation.  Russian  officials  have insisted  that since the country has no offensive biological weapons program , there is no need to cooperate . But it also appears  Russia is reverting back to Soviet –era habits . Putin’s security services went on a hunt for suspected spies among  scientists , which put a chill on joint projects with the West.
Russia has long refused to open the doors  of three military biological research facilities . to this day , it is unknown  how far the Soviet Union  went in creating warheads  and bombs from bacteria  and viruses  that were developed  at Obolensk and Vector. Did the Soviets produce a super-plague  resistant to antibiotics?  Did they create  a cruise missile capable of disseminating  anthrax bacteria spores? Or warheads for an intercontinental ballistic missile  to carry small pox? And if they did these things , all in  violation  of an international  treated they signed  in 1972, should the details at last be brought to light? ¹¹ A string of Russian anti-plague institutes and stations that once fed into the germ warfare  program  also remained closed to Western cooperation. If there are no weapons, no offensive program , as Russia claims , then what is behind the closed doors? What formulas for weaponization  remain in the military laboratories?  And most importantly , what has become of the scientists  with know-how to create pathogens  that can be carried in shirt pocket?

What are they working on today?

If it wasn’t worrisome  enough  that Russia  was weak and vulnerable  after the Soviet  collapse, another jolt came in the 1990s : terrorists  and cults  were in search  of weapons of mass destruction.  The people who would commit  mass terror  lacked the resources  or industrial  base of a  government  or military , but they burned  with the ambition  to kill  in a large and theatrical way. Terrorism  certainly wasn’t new , but terrorists  in possession  of the arsenals of the Cold War  would be devastating .

In 1995, the Aum  Shinrikyo  cult released  the deadly  nerve  agent  sarin on three Tokyo  subway trains , killing  twelve  people , injuring  over one  thousand  and causing mass panic.  Technical problems , leaks and accidents plagued the cult. But the Tokyo subway attack  showed only what only a small  amount of dangerous  material could do.  The Tokyo calamity resulted from 159 ounces  of sarin. By contrast , in Russia , in a  remote  compound  near the town of  Shchuchye in western Siberia there are still 1.9 million projectiles  filled with 5,447 metric tons of nerve agents. ¹²

 Osama bin Laden  was reportedly  impressed with the Tokyo subway disaster  and the chaos it generated. In1998,  Al Qaeda  leaders  began to launch  a serious  chemical  and biological weapon effort, code-named Zabadi , or “ curdled milk” in Arabic. Details  of the effort were later revealed  in documents  found  on a computer  used by the Al Qaeda  leadership  in Kabul. Ayman Zawahri , the former  Cairo surgeon  who that year merged his radical group  , Islamic Jihad  in Egypt , with Al Qaeda , noted that” the destructive  power of these weapons  is not less  than that of nuclear weapons.”¹³  In 1999, Zawahiri recruited a Pakistani scientist to set up a small biological  weapons laboratory  in Kandhar . Later , the work was turned over  to a Malaysian  who knew the 9/11 hijackers  and had helped them, Yazid Sufaat.  He had been educated in biology and chemistry  in California , and spent months  at the Kandahar laboratory attempting to cultivate  anthrax. George Tenet , the former  CIA director , said the anthrax  effort was carried  out in parallel  with plot  to hijack airplanes  and crash them into buildings. ¹⁴ He believed , he said , that bin Laden’s strongest  desire was to go nuclear . At one point , the CIA frantically chased  down reports  that bin  Laden  was negotiating  for the purchase  of three Russian nuclear devices , although details were never found. “ They understand that bombings by cars , trucks, trains  , and planes  will get them some headlines to be sure,” Tenet wrote.” But if they manage to set off a mushroom cloud , they will make history …. Even in the darkest days  of the Cold War , we could count on the fact  that the Soviets , just like us , wanted to live. Not so with the terrorists.”¹⁵

 It is difficult to build  a working nuclear bomb , but less difficult to cultivate pathogens  in a laboratory.  A congressional commission concluded in 2008 that it would be hard for terrorists  to weaponize  and disseminate  significant quantities  of a biological  agent in aerosol form , but it might not be so difficult  to find someone to do it for them.” In other words,” the panel said,”  given the high –level  of know how  needed to use  disease  as a weapon  to cause mass casualties , the United States  should be less concerned that terrorists will become biologists and far more concerned that biologists  will become terrorists.” ¹⁶   

The tools of mass casualty  are more diffuse  and more uncertain  than ever before . Even  as securing  the weapons  of the former Soviet Union  remains unfinished  business , the world we live in confronts  new risks  that go far beyond Biopreparat.  Today one can threaten a whole society with a flask  carrying pathogens  created in a fermenter in  a hidden garage –and without a detectable signature.

The Dead Hand of the arms race is still alive. 

Dr. I.R.Durrani 

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Posted in Gorbachev, OBL, Reagan, sarin, the chemical warfare, the halt to the arms race