Consensus For Pakistan’s
Nuclear Test:
On
May 28, 1998, Pakistan announced the
test of five nuclear explosive devices
in the Chagai Hills in the
western province of Baluchistan . A mere seventeen days after neighboring
India had shocked the world with its
first nuclear tests since 1974,
Pakistan’s response came as a surprise to many observers. Some had doubted that Pakistan
possessed the capability to construct
a nuclear explosive. But even those who thought that Pakistan could test a weapon
were astonished by the speed of the Pakistani reaction. Many observers
wondered how a poor country
recovering from catastrophic wars and national dismemberment ---and struggling with national identity crises---could devote
its limited state resources to acquiring such potentially destructive technology.1
Pakistan’s
nuclear program evolved under immensely
complex and challenging security
circumstances. Structural
generalizations do not explain the
complexities of its historical existence
and evolution unless a holistic
account is understood. This chapter
examines that historical experience ---a blend of cultural nuances , idiosyncrasies of personalities ,
and the multitudinous pulls of domestic
politics, regional crises, and geographical compulsions , as well as technical
challenges , global politics , and international barriers
to nuclear materials and
know-how.
Nuclear
technology is now nearing seven decades of development , but nuclear
politics and technological determinism remain the quintessential factors in
internationals relations , especially
for developing states. Fascination in mastering the mystery
of the atom is as much alive today as it was in the early 50s , when many of the developing world states broke free
from the yoke of colonialism. Despite
the many decades of the
nuclear age exposing the dangers
and blessings of nuclear energy ,
atomic weapons are considered a
life-line for states like Pakistan and Israel ,” orphan states” in the international system outside the
U.S. Nuclear umbrella. 2 In
this sense , the story of nuclear Pakistan
is sui generis among nuclear weapon-capable states in contemporary times. Although many of its
compulsions and rationales are comparable to those of other nuclear
powers that earlier decided
to take the same path, what would
cause Pakistan to fulfill almost literally its vow to ‘eat grass or go
hungry’ in its quest for the
nuclear weapon? Why and how did
Pakistan stand in defiance of the world
to acquire a capability described by Bernard Brodie as the ‘ absolute weapon’?
3
Like
the history of Pakistan state, the story of Pakistan’s nuclear program is one of unwavering resolve and
dedication. Pakistani senior
officials tapped into the genius of young scientists and engineers and molded them into a motivated cadre of
weaponeers. Building on this reservoir of talent , the program outlasted
perennial political crises and persisted
despite poor civil-military relations . The young nation’s leaders and
scientists were united by the fascination with the new nuclear science and consciously interwove nuclear developments
into the broader narrative of Pakistani
nationalism. They were unwilling
to allow India’s strategic
developments to go unanswered , and more assiduously the program was opposed by India and the West , the more
precious it became. It evolved into the
most significant symbol
of national determination and central element of Pakistan’s identity.
Pakistan’s
enduring rivalry and strategic competition
with India turned bitter over subsequent decades after a series of wars
and crises. The last major war in 1971
resulted in humiliating military-defeat
and dismemberment of Pakistan,
which simply reinforced its belief that its
adversaries were determined to destroy
the very existence of the new state. This perception united the nation state into a “ never again” mind-set that found succor
in the acquisition of nuclear
capability . However , there were twin causes
for its national dismemberment in
1971—external aggression and internal instability. The
development of a nuclear capability
and robust command system might partially address one-half of the equation –that is, deterrence against external threat from India. But
Pakistan has so far failed to address
the other more dangerous half that threatens national survivability --- domestic
dissension and internal conflict . It was Pakistan’s inability to develop a viable political system that failed to
bring harmony and nationalism to a
religiously homogeneous but ethnically and linguistically diverse
people . Although the quest to acquire
a nuclear weapons capability was fundamentally drawn
from outside threats , East Pakistan’s
geographical separation , with a hostile India situated
between the two wings of the
country , was a vulnerability waited to be exploited.
Theory and Approach: Why do states pursue nuclear weapons , and how do they do
so? What , if anything , is unique about the
Pakistani case? The realists (
neorealists) would suggest that states
are concerned primarily with
maximizing security.4 When
faced with external threats and an unfavorable distribution
of political , economic , and military
capabilities with its adversaries,
government officials have two
fundamental options. They can either bandwagon , by accepting the dominance of the stronger state
and relying on it for continued
safety , ors eek to “ balance”
against the power asymmetry and
security challenge posed by the
adversary. The option to bandwagon frequently requires the weaker state to compromise its national
sovereignty? 5 The second
option can be achieved through the
pursuit of alliances( external
balancing) or through the development of
military capabilities ( internal
balancing). 6
According
to Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt,
states usually choose to balance against
the most serious foreign threats
to their security ; rarely do they
bandwagon ---that is , accommodate or appease
the powers making these threats .7
Further
defense planners generally prefer internal
balancing because it leaves less
to chance and less to the will of
others; however, this strategy requires levels
of national determination and
resources that are beyond the reach
of most countries, including Pakistan . While allies were crucial
in the pre-nuclear era to help
states fend off foreign aggression , realists recognize that
nuclear weaponry has made internal balancing both more
feasible and more urgent , especially to states such as Pakistan that face
security threats from nuclear armed neighbors.
All
nuclear weapons development
programs constitute a response
to insecurity and a form of
balancing against foreign political or military threats. States will choose
to build nuclear bombs if the pursuit of other time-honored policies –such as strengthening their conventional military capabilities , acquiring different
weapons of mass destruction , or
aligning with foreign powers ---are
either not available or insufficient to
provide the security of the state. 8
An
alternative explanation by Jacques Hymans surmises that ideas
produced by national,
cultural , or individual attributes and idealist approaches can explain
much about worldviews, motives , and decision-making styles of specific state leaders who engage
in nuclear proliferation . 9
To
understand why some countries pursue
nuclear deterrence –and certainly to
understand how they operationalize that deterrent ---one must understand the strategic
culture of the country in
question . The passion and fervor with which Pakistan acquired
nuclear weapons are only
partially explained by realism . What is
necessary is to supplement realism
with more fine grained
predictions derived from Pakistan’s
unique strategic culture---“ a collectivity of the beliefs , norms,
values , and historical experiences of the dominant elite in a polity that influences their understanding and interpretation of security issues and
environment , and shapes their response
to these .”10 Strategic culture stands as an important intervening variable between changes in the material bases of
power and state behavior. 11
“
Strategic culture” is a slippery term, which presents challenges to any study
employing it. The definition used in this account ,
proposed by respected Pakistani
scholar Hassan Askari- Rizvi,
argues that historical experiences
have important explanatory
value in the development of beliefs and in assessing how a given state
responds to a given threat to national security. 12 Strategic
culture is the mediating lens
through which national leaders
view reality , which, while not permanent , is slow to change . National
elites are socialized into a strategic
culture , and in the process come to share
these beliefs, norm and values. Frequently , strategic culture
will be a source of constancy in
the midst of a changing international environment .
Peter
R. Lavoy argues that Jawaharlal Nehru
and Homi Bhabha played the role of “ nuclear mythmakers.” 13 Lavoy defined “ nuclear mythmaking “ as an
approach adopted by national elites ( mythmakers) who
want government to adopt
a national security strategy of acquiring nuclear weapons by emphasizing the country’s insecurity and poor international standing ; portraying this strategy
as the best corrective measure;
articulating political, economic, and technical feasibility ; successfully associating
these beliefs with existing cultural norms and political priorities; and finally convincing national decision –makers to act
on these views. 14
Lavoy
provides an analytic pathway as to how
myths turn into strategic beliefs. He examines primary
and auxiliary assertions that
drive leaders to convince decision -makers and ultimately create a popular national goal.
The
primary beliefs are based on two
levels of relationship . The first level is
the relationship between nuclear
weapons acquisition and the military dimension of security , which lays the foundation on which the second level develops in term of a state’s political status and its influence in international affairs. These levels are
supplemented by four auxiliary requirements , which relate to
articulating political , economic ,
strategic , and technological feasibilities.
The state must have the developed
capacity to manage political problems associated with developing nuclear weapons and their impact on relations
with important states ; the wherewithal to meet financial costs associated
with acquisition or development of nuclear technology , including the possibility for other spin –offs such as industry , agriculture , and medicine
; the capability to develop operational
nuclear weapons and to devise options for their effective use in
military operations; and the
infrastructure and capacity to overcome the numerous technical
difficulties associated with developing nuclear weapons with the possibility for
industrial spin offs. When leaders
acquire the capability to articulate the six interrelated factors with panache
and convincing aplomb , it is a matter
of time for them to become embedded in the strategic culture
of the nation state. 15
The
person who spear headed the idea of
nuclear Pakistan was Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto. In Pakistan ‘s early history there was no consensus about the desirability or utility of nuclear weapons . Only a few
individuals, most notably Bhutto , believed that acquiring them was
critical for Pakistan . However,
following the devastating loss of East Pakistan in 1971 and the Indian nuclear test in 1974, opinions favoring nuclear weapons , held only by a minority ,
became national consensus ---the necessity of nuclear weapons became a
mainstream belief. This belief
eventually determined the
discourse of Pakistan nuclear thinking that evolved gradually ---first into
developing a nuclear weapon capability
that took some twenty-five years , and later operationalizing it after being forced to demonstrate that capability.
In
the Indian case , the shock of losing
the 1962 war with China combined with the Chinese nuclear test at Lop Nor in 1964 eventually led to the Indian test in
1974. 16 Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru ‘s and Indian Chief
Scientist Homi Bhabha’s arguments became
dominant , even though neither
survived to see the
ascendancy of those beliefs. In the Pakistan case, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto played a similar
role and nurtured the nuclear program
throughout the important decade of the 1970s.
Today,
there are three important strategic
beliefs regarding nuclear weapons that were largely absent when Bhutto took
power in 1971 but have since become dominant
in Pakistani strategic thought.
First , nuclear weapons are the only guarantee of Pakistan’s national survival
in the face of both an
inveterately hostile India that cannot
be deterred conventionally and unreliable external allies that fail to deliver in the extremis. Second, Pakistan ‘s nuclear program is unfairly singled out the international opposition because of
its Muslim population. This feeling of
victimization is accentuated by a belief
that India consistently “ gets
away with “ violating global
nonproliferation norms. Third is the
belief that India, Israel , or the United States might use military force
to stop Pakistan’s nuclear program. Today, these three beliefs ---
nuclear necessity for survival ,
international discrimination against
Pakistan , and danger of disarming attacks---form the centre of Pakistani
strategic thinking about nuclear weapons
. Collectively these convictions have served
to reinforce the determination of Pakistan’s military , bureaucratic , and
scientific establishment to pay and political, economic, or technical cost to
reach their objective of nuclear armed
Pakistan.
Zulfiqar
Ali Bhutto was able to capture this all –encompassing narrative even before
there was any national consensus on nuclear matters. He continued to push for
nuclear developments as foreign
minister in the 1960s and played a critical
role during the period as national leader in the 1970s . By the time he
was removed from power in 1977, his thinking on nuclear matters had been institutionalized throughout the establishment . Ample patrons
in the military , bureaucracy , and
scientific communities would ensure the nuclear program’s success in the 1980s
and 1990s. Today the national narrative around
the need for nuclear weapons is
intertwined with Pakistani nationalism to a
level that it I almost treasonous to think otherwise.
Nuclear Themes : While
it is too strong a statement to say that every nuclear state has the same
historical experience , it is useful to highlight the similarities.
Underneath the unique strategic
beliefs of Pakistan are several
themes that similar to those found in the histories of other nuclear aspirants. Three
threads interweave through the
fabric of many nuclear weapons acquisition
stories : national humiliation , international isolation , and national
identity . When Pakistanis look back on their history , these themes are recurrent
and provide a conceptual foundation
from which specific strategic
belief s emerge.
National Humiliation : At
the core of the nuclear weapons
acquisition narrative rests national humiliation---the phrase “
never again” is repeated over and
over in nuclear histories. For many
nations , fears produced by past
humiliations are frequently reinforced by
concerns about nuclear blackmail. The Soviet Union after experiences the ravages
of invading Nazi armies , refused
to accept the danger that came from an
American nuclear monopoly. 17 China’s
nuclear ambitions were fueled by a century of foreign interference , a brutal Japanese
occupation , and U.S. nuclear threats in the 1950s. 18 India’s
national humiliation stemmed from
colonial subjugation , an embarrassing
defeat in its border war with China in 1962, and the strategic disparity
following the Chinese nuclear test at
Lop Nor in 1964. 19 Israel is a state created to ensure that “ never
again” would the Jewish people face
risk of national extermination , and
nuclear weapons became perceived increasingly as central to that requirement in the context
of enduring Arab-Israeli enmity .20
For
Pakistan, the memories –both first hand
and passed down – of the fall of
Dacca , the loss of East Pakistan, and
the capture of ninety thousand prisoners
of war by India are seared into collective memory. The tragedies of 1971
left Pakistan reeling , and were
followed by the subsequent blow of the
1974 Indian nuclear test. Together , these events allowed nuclear enthusiasts to take charge
and led to the ascendance of Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto and his belief in the necessity of nuclear arms . Nuclear weapon efforts were
redoubled after India’s underground
explosion at Pokhran three years later . The asymmetry is strategic
capability between India and Pakistan reinforced
the feeling of insecurity that had lingered after
Dhaka’s fall. The Pakistani
nuclear weapons program was the only way
to prevent such humiliation in
the future and to preserve Pakistan. “
Never again” would Pakistan be subject to disgrace
at the hands of others.
International Isolation: Some nuclear weapon
states find themselves on the receiving
end of international demonization , which serves only to buttress national resolve to develop advanced technology . While the Russian experience
was somewhat different –it
is difficult to call nascent superpower
isolated---the USSR was the target
of Western castigation for its socialist way of life . Nuclear weapons were not
only a security imperative
but also proof to the West of Soviet
scientific advancement.
China found itself ideologically
disconnect not just from Western foes but also, and increasingly , from its former Soviet
patrons. Israel faced opprobrium from much
of the postcolonial world, and
criticisms grew as Soviet –backed
pan-Arabism emerged as an important political force in the 1950s.
Many nuclear
aspirants are also harshly reminded
that to the extent that they have international support , such support is insufficient or , more often , ephemeral during periods of
profound political crisis .
Israel’s early history showed that the United Sates would subordinate Israel’s interest during periods of
tension in an attempt to maintain stability between the superpowers. Israel’s
battlefield successes in 1947-48 and
1967 occurred with little foreign
support . Soviet backing did little to
ease Chinese hardships in Korea or to
face U.S. threats in other crises
regarding Taiwan in 1955. Tensions
between Soviet President Nikita
Khrushchev and Chinese communist leader Mao Zedong grew in the mid -1950s ,
ultimately leading to the cessation of Soviet assistance to the Chinese nuclear program in 1959. India found itself isolated : it initially received
neither U.S. nor Soviet assistance
in 1962 war with China . Delhi’s calculations had gone woefully wrong when its forward policy on the disputed territory provoked a border war with China . But, unfortunately for India , it occurred simultaneously with the Cuban Missile Crisis between the two Cold War super –powers. Following China’s nuclear test
in 1964, India’s hawks began to
dominate the debate. The mood of the nation
was summed up in a famous speech of renowned Indian scientist Homi Bhabha :” [A]tomic weapons
give a state possessing them in adequate numbers
a deterrent power against attack
from a much stronger State.” 21 Eventually the bomb lobby in India
would prevail , while India continued to believe it was on its own . In 1965, India was
disgusted that United States had cut
off aid to both India and Pakistan ,
despite Delhi’s belief that Pakistan
was aggressor in the five-week
long Second Kashmir War.
For
Pakistanis, history showed that outsiders would
not assist them in confronting
security threats, particularly during the periods of most pressing need.
Pakistan’s alliance with the United
States provided no benefit in the 1965 war and proved traumatically
insufficient to stop military
defeat in East Pakistan in 1971.
While Pakistan entered into an alliance with the United States primarily to answer
the Indian threat , the United States
viewed the alliance solely
through the prism of super power competition and had little interest in Pakistan’s fears about India . Similarly , Pakistan’s
all-weather friendship with China translated into little material support
for Pakistan when it counted most,
in either the 1965or 1971 wars.
After Pakistan embarked seriously on the nuclear path , it increasingly was the focus of Western proliferation concerns.
Conspiracy theories that Pakistan was being targeted for its “Muslimness” grew, along with the
resentment . This perception of international
isolation only served to
reinforced the Pakistani state’s
devotion to achieving nuclear self-sufficiency.
National Identity: Most nuclear programs are not initiated with national identity as a driving factor , but often they eventually
become integral to national
self-perception and are thus
perpetuated by their symbolic place in national identity . Sacrifices associated
with the nuclear program made in
the face of international opposition , combined with the belief that nuclear weapons are the only answer to
prevent future humiliation , confer
symbolic meaning upon the nation’s sense of self.
By 1971, all five permanent members of the UN Security Council were recognized as nuclear weapon states by the Treaty
on the Non –proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) , and nuclear weapons
were perceived as the currency of
international power. Moreover , the scientific, technical , and logistical challenge
of nuclear development elicits pride
in societies that are able to
harness their national potential to join what is arguably the most elite club in the world .
A.Q. Khan boasted of Pakistan’s success
in uranium enrichment :” A country which
could not make sewing needles , good bicycles or even ordinary durable
metalled roads was embarking on one of the latest and most difficult
technologies.” 22
Pakistan
‘s sense of national identity has a complex relationship with its Islamic identity . The
perception that Pakistan is a
victim of discrimination –that the world
is opposed uniquely to an “ Islamic bomb” ---became a source
of pride. Of the Muslim polities , only Pakistan has managed to cross the
nuclear threshold . This nuclear
accomplishment gave Pakistan a certain preeminence in the Islamic world. It is , perhaps, no
surprise then , that Zuliqar Ali Bhutto , the force behind the nuclear program , pivoted Pakistani
foreign policy to enhance ties to other
Muslim countries. Moreover , Bhutto
adroitly leveraged these relationships to garner financial support for Pakistan’s
nuclear program . Such global prominence
, in Pakistan thought, harkened back to
past civilizational glory, to the time when the Mughal Empire shared the global
stage with the Safavids and the
Ottomans. Additionally , for Pakistan , a country conflicted over whether it is
a secular or theological Muslim state,
nuclear weapons were a symbol of cohesion ---they became one of the few issues about which there was national consensus.
Dr. I.R Durrani
PS. The references embedded in the text will be provided later.
CONSENSUS FOR PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR TEST!!