"PUNISHING PAKISTAN"

PUNISHING PAKISTAN:

By the mid 1970s, Prime Minister Bhutto was at the peak of his power, but he was quickly losing political allies as well as the patience  of his colleagues . His fascination with socialist ideals were gone; the founding members  of Pakistan’s People’s Party (PPP) were equally disillusioned . Bhutto  thought that by appeasing Islamists  opponents, he could pragmatism to his politics  and stall his plummeting  popularity. Instead, this strategy led Bhutto down a slippery  slope of concessions from which he never recovered. 

In the spring of 1976 Bhutto handpicked  a new army chief, Zia ul Haq, whose appointment  superseded  the rank of many senior generals. . It is not known whom the retiring  Army Chief  Tikka Khan  recommended  as his successor , but apparently  Prime Minister  Zulfi Bhutto  was smitten  with Lieutenant General Zia ul Haq’s  sycophancy.  In particular , the impressive  reception  that Zia  had arranged  when Bhutto  visited the Multan garrison  in 1975  certainly  must have earned  him partiality . Breaking  military  tradition  , Zia ul Haq, corps commander  in Multan , had ordered  officers and families to line up on the streets and give a rousing  welcome to the beloved leader.

Bhutto’s  decision  to appoint  Zia –ul- Haq changed  the fate  of the country  and raises  several questions: Had  Bhutto examined  the military dossiers  of all senior generals  before making his final selection ?¹  If so,  how could  Bhutto have ignored  some concerning traits  of Zia –ul-Haq’s military  career , all of were recorded in his dossier ? Did Bhutto  deliberately  select a  military leader believing him to be a sycophant   that would keep the military subservient  and his control?

General Zia ul Haq’s Islamic  bent  and his adventurous  character  were evident  in his reputation , and even his military record  foreshadowed his impact on the course of history.²  In 1970, then brigadier  Zia ul Haq was posted  to Jordan  as King Hussein’s military advisor and subsequently  played a controversial role in military  operations against  the Palestinian uprising  , famously  known as “ Black September.” Zia allegedly exceeded  his advisory capacity  by actively directing  military operations. The uprising was crushed , but Zia’s  conduct  came under scrutiny , especially  by the Pakistani embassy . Brigadier  Zia ul Haq  did not enjoy amicable relations  with the Pakistani  ambassador  to Jordon  , and the two had often clashed  over mundane  administrative  issues. Eventually , Zia –ul- Haq’s reporting  officer  in  Jordon,  Major  General Nawazish  , gave him an “  adverse report” , which  should have ended  his military career.³   But Zia challenged the report. His plea was accepted , and shortly thereafter  , he was promoted to the rank of Major General  and assigned to the prestigious command of the 1 Armored Division Multan.

Friction soon developed  between Zia ul Haq and his immediate superior ---Corps  Commander  Lieutenant General  Muhammad Sharif.  Writing the annual confidential report (ACR)  of Major General  Zia ul Haq , the corps commander observed Zia tendency  to bypass the chain of command.  This comment was very similar  to what the Pakistani embassy in Amman  had reported earlier. Army Chief Tikka Khan  supported  the corps  commander’s  assessment  and wrote I his remarks “ the general officer  must adhere  to the advice  of his corps commander.” ⁴   Once again,  however, Zia  career advancement  was not  adversely affected , as he was later promoted  to the rank ofa  three star  general replacing Sharif as corps commander  in Multan. Zia ul Haq’s professional military record was impressive , and his conservative nature  and religious convictions were never obstacles;  rather, they were assets to Yahya Khan’s  military regime  , which had a reputation  for drunkenness  and debauchery  that was blamed in part for the 1971 disaster . In all probability  his conservative background  and straightforward professional record overshadowed  some of his less desirable traits.

Thus , Prime Minister  Bhutto  was likely oblivious  to Zia’s negative traits when he made him  the army  chief. He promoted both Muhammad Sharif and Zia ul Haq  to the rank  of four star general  and appointed the two rivals to the positions of Chairman  Joint  Chiefs  of Staff Committee (CJSC)  and Chief of the Army Staff ( COAS), respectively. It is the author’s view  that there is only one plausible explanation  for Zia’s promotion---to explot the cleavage  between the two senior commanders. Bhutto made a Machiavellian move to keep the two men focused  on each other  and thus keep the military away from the domain of civilian  power. And as usual , the sycophant Zia continued to publicly praise the prime minister in a manner and with an eloquence that boosted Bhutto’s ego. ⁵

Bhutto was acutely conscious of the need to modernize the armed forces. In February 1975, he successfully negotiated  with President Gerald Ford  to lift  the decade  -old U.S. arms  embargo, and Pakistan  became the recipient  of the U.S.  equipment  of helicopters  once again.  While the military  was fully supported  for force  modernization , the nuclear question was still a point of contention  and debate.

Bhutto’s Focus on the Nuclear Program : After India’s nuclear test , Bhutto set the nuclear weapons program  into high gear , and from  1974 onward  it was the highest national  security  priority . However , the program  needed oversight  in order  to efficiently handle diplomacy , procurement , finances  and many other issues for which Bhutto had little time. He nevertheless  continued  to be the ultimate decision maker  for the program. Eventually Bhutto established  an inter-ministerial  coordinating committee  to undertake the tasks listed above , as well as to generally  smooth over any bumps in the nuclear program.

In the remaining three years  of Bhutto’s tenure , Pakistan  pursued all options  to bring the nuclear fuel cycle  to its logical  conclusion, which would open up the prospects  for both  a military  weapons program  and a civilian  program for nuclear energy. Bhutto realized  that after the India nuclear test , the international  community  would act quickly  to close  the window  of opportunity for the procurement  of technical capability . In spite of the inter—ministerial  coordinating  committee, the nuclear program  continued to face difficulties  in diplomacy , financing  and technical capacity. Ultimately , Bhutto did  see the nuclear fuel cycle’s  completion  during his time in office  , and he blamed  the United States for his lack of progress.

The prime minister  correctly anticipated  that time was at a premium  and Pakistani  efforts  would meet many obstacles. The United States  also correctly read  Bhutto’s intentions , especially  after the Indian nuclear test . Islamabad, however,  expected the United States to understand Pakistan’s strategic  anxiety  after the test  and was disappointed when , instead  of penalizing  India, the United States was eyeing  Pakistan’s procurement  activities, while also dissuading  Western allies  from nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. Pakistan ‘s strategy was to keep its procurement  activities  within the limits  of commercial law of the country  and if necessary , operate within the legal grey areas. When individuals were caught , Pakistan would at times  officially deny U.S. allegations and disassociate  itself  from illegal  activities. At other times it would privately  explain to the United States that it had to do what  was  in its national interest. Pakistan  would then use diplomacy to mitigate  the damage,  especially  during te critical periods  of the Cold War  when Pakistan’s  role was strategically  significant  to U.S.  security objectives . This cat –and –mouse  game of sorts  would last for three decades.⁶ 

Canada and Germany had followed America’s lead  by refusing to supply  a nuclear  fuel fabrication  plant and a  heavy water production  plant, respectively. The Unite Sates  them mounted  pressure  on France  to abrogate  its agreement  to supply  a commercial  fuel reprocessing  plant . Give this trend , Pakistan  thought  that to avoid  conflict, it had to stay ahead of the game.

To gain France’s trust , Pakistan  agreed to all conductions posed by the foreign supplier : the PAEC was ready and willing to accept  all conditions  for imported plants  and equipment , to place facilities  under IAEA  safeguards, and to  meet any other legal obligations  demanded  by the exporting country. Pakistan’s policy  at the time was to acquire  nuclear capabilities  without  violating international law,  hurting  its diplomatic posture, or jeopardizing  the PAEC’s good standing with the IAEA. Further, the country  could not afford  to imperil  its political  and economic  support from international  organizations, as Bhutto ‘s economic policies had all but crippled the economy.

Pakistani officials  would later point out  that, unlike  India, Pakistan  did not violate  any international safeguards agreements and always abided  by foreign contracts . However, their  concerns and pleas  fell on deaf years. From the Western perspective , India’s test was a fait accompli, and the real concern  was the cascading  effects of horizontal  proliferation. Pakistan  was an obvious state of focus . A non member  of the NPT and known to be in strategic rivalry with India , Pakistan  would certainly react  in some way  to India’s provocation ; thus, even peaceful  acquisition  of nuclear technologies  would have military intentions. Rather tragically  for Pakistan , the more it advertised  its anguish  and security predicaments  to the world, the more supporters it lost. Pakistan was on  its own  to end off  its troubles with India.

In December 1976, Canada  abruptly cut off all supplies , including  nuclear fuel, heavy water , spare parts  , and technical support for KANUPP, PAEC scientists revealed that sudden withdrawal of  personnel  had endangered the safety of the power plant. The Pakistani  diplomatic  and scientific  communities  were now incensed  that Canada,  although it had reasons  to be upset  with India’s actions, was projecting  its anger  onto Pakistan . Clearly , when Pakistan  turned to China for help on the safety  of KANUPP, China was not only sympathetic ; it had other incentives ---especially  an opportunity  to examine  a Western –made power reactor.

Under the populist  leadership  of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto , public support  for the nuclear program  had developed quickly . Government rhetoric  about injustice , discrimination , and unfair treatment  of Pakistan  gained popular appeal  and bolstered the “ never again” theme. The government line also sparked  widespread   belief  that te West was determined  to prevent a Muslim country  from acquiring a nuclear capability. This perception, coupled  with Pakistani  security predicaments , exacerbated  the national sense  of isolation. By the mid 1970s , Bhutto had lost faith in his alliance  with the Wst  and directed  his foreign policy  to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)  and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) . Bhutto  openly championed  the causes  of the Third World , the north-south , divide , and Islam.

In addition , the prime minister’s socialist leanings  led him to search  for stronger friendships in the East. His overtures to China  and North Korea  to acquire  conventional defense  and strategic organizations of the three countries into business  with each other. ⁷  Pakistani scientists  quickly adopted  reverse engineering  techniques  and new methods  of technical  substitution . Bhutto was confident  that his Western trained Ph. D.s  in science  and technology  would be capable of mastering  these arts , thus allowing them to copy  and customize  new technologies. ⁸  However, reverse engineering was not always possible as France’s reprocessing plant forbade copying or reproducing designs.

On April 4,1979 , Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto , the political father of the Pakistani bomb , was hanged. Just two days later, on April 6, the Carter administration  applied the Symington Law to Pakistan  and suspended aid. ⁹  Although  there was  no direct  causal  relationship  between the U.S. sanctions  and Bhutto ‘s death , some theorize  that Zia ul Haq’s disregard  for President  Carter’s  appeal  for clemency  may have triggered  Washington’s anger. ¹⁰   If the Symington  law was intended to punish Pakistan , it only bolstered  Pakistan’s determination  to pursue its nuclear program.

Pursuit of the French Reprocessing Plant: Munir Ahmed Khan , Chairman PAEC  had spent thirteen years in the IAEA  in the Nuclear Power and Reactor Division  and had many friends  and contacts in Europe. He had a  keen understanding  of power reactor  and reprocessing technologies  and was well aware  of France’s pioneering  role  in reprocessing  and plutonium  extraction. After his appointment  as PAEC chair , Munir returned  to Vienna  to officially  end his  employment  with the IAEA. There he met  a French delegate  to discuss  the possible sale of a reprocessing  plant to Pakistan . ¹¹ 

France was eager to make profits  from nuclear commerce  with developing  countries. ¹² Pakistan was just as  enthusiastic  to tap  into French  source , as it would contribute  to reprocessing  know-how and help train  Pakistani scientists  in the back end  of the fuel cycle.  Other Western countries  , such as West Germany and Italy , were also willing to share  reprocessing technologies , as they had with Brazil. ¹³  However , since France  was not a signatory  to the NPT at the time, the PAEC concluded  that the country  might not feel  overly obligated  to insist  on stringent conditions or safeguards. ¹⁴ 

French firm Saint –Gobain Technique Nouvelle ( SGN)  specialized  in spent  fuel reprocessing  and plutonium  extraction  through the solvent extraction method. ¹⁵

The purchase plans  for a  reprocessing plant  were “ on the drawing board”  in the late 1960s , and even then SGN was a  willing partner. ¹⁶  Indeed a Planning Commission  report cites  the approval  of the Executive  Committee  of the National Economic  Council ( ECNEC)  for the purchase of reprocessing plants , a fuel fabrication  facility  for KANUPP, a thirteen –ton per  annum  heavy  water plant  for Multan , and a plutonium  extraction plant. ¹⁷

In Pakistan’s initial talks  with SGN  after 1972 the reprocessing  plant  under consideration  was modest , boasting  only a thirty-ton capacity. During negotiations  , however,  SGN suggested  a plant  with a capacity  of one hundred tons  of reactor fuel , as it was cost-effective  at only a marginal  difference in price. Since Pakistan’s long term  plans  would require  a larger plant , Pakistan agreed , and the two parties  began to discuss  whether the transfer should be on a  turnkey basis or whether  SGN  should design  the plant  and Pakistan’s  construct  it. Finally , they settled on the next option. ¹⁸

Two separate agreements  were signed  by the PAEC  and SGN  to build  an industrial –scale  reprocessing plant  at Chashma  , in the Punjab Province. The first contract  , signed in march 1973 , was for the basic design  of the plant;  the second , signed  on October 18,1974, called for a “ Detailed design”  and the plant’s construction . In the latter contract , SGN  promised  to provide  blueprints , designs, and  specifications; procedure equipment   from suppliers ; and put the plant into operation.  In exchange, SGN would earn $10 million, and other French  contractors  would earn upward of $45 million . France  was also trying  to secure more orders—at least  three to four 600- MW power reactors , Mirage fighter- bombers , and other hardware  for Pakistan and other Arab states. ¹⁹   

French  experts  raised  questions  about the economic  and industrial  justification  for a reprocessing plant  with a capacity  of one hundred tons  per year  in Pakistan . In response , the PAEC  presented France  with the October 1973 IAEA report  justifying the construction of twenty—four  nuclear power reactors  in Pakistan  by the end of the century. However,  the IAEA  plan came under  criticism , especially after the Indian  nuclear test , because  of doubts regarding  Pakistan ‘s true intentions. ²⁰ It remains  uncertain whether the plan  to build  twenty –four  power reactors was a ruse  to justify  the ongoing  purchase of a one hundred  -ton reprocessing plant, or vice versa. ²¹ PAEC’s  excessive  energies  devoted  to the purchase of the reprocessing plant was raising doubts  about its use for peaceful purposes.  Nevertheless , from a technical standpoint, the reprocessing  plant would have yielded  enough  fuel to reduce  Pakistan’s dependence on the scarce  uranium  reserves and increase the country’s self sufficiency. ²²

After India’s 1974 nuclear  test, France insisted that reprocessing  plant be placed  under IAEA safeguards. ²³ Although  displeased , Pakistan decided not to  cause a  confrontation  and agreed  to the new to the new demand , referring the French  request  to the IAEA Board of Governors. Finally the sale was approved in 1976, and in the following  month Pakistan  and the IAEA reached an agreement. The Chashma  reprocessing  facility would now be under full IAEA inspection  and safeguards , and Pakistan  pledged  not to divert  the materials for nuclear weapons  manufacturing  or any other  military purpose. ²⁴

As both  negotiations  for IAEA safeguards and SGN  designs  were in progress , the French began  to shift their position , expressing  concern  that once Pakistan  had obtained  the detailed  design , there would be little need for outside help  to construct it indigenously . ²⁵  The French began  to offer  a variety  of options  intended to let the purchase pass , while enduring  the facility’s peaceful purpose. A new design for the plant  was offered to Pakistan , whose end product  would be mixed –oxide fuel rather than plutonium. Munir Khan tried  to reason with his  French  counterparts  that Pakistan  had no intention  of acquiring or building  breeder reactors; hence mixed—oxide  fuel  would be of no utility . Foreign Secretary  Agha Shahi  formally rejected  the modified  French proposal , insisting that Pakistan had met all of its obligations and agreed  to IAEA safeguards, and thus would not accept  any modifications to the original  agreement. ²⁶ 

Given this setback , Pakistan’s leadership  assessed  that the SGN deal  would  never go through  . Soon Islamabad  began to believe  that Western powers  had accepted  India’s  de-facto  entrance into the nuclear club , but were determined  to block Pakistan  by every possible means. It was obvious  that France was acting under immense pressure from the United States , and by that time, Kissinger  was directly  pressuring Bhutto , with carrots and sticks , to stop his pursuit of a nuclear program.

If Bhutto had planned  to continue  to press France  on the deal  as  strategy  to protect  the secret highly enriched  uranium (HEU) , Pakistani diplomats  abroad  were seemingly  not in sync with this national strategy. Several gaffes were made , but fortunately Pakistan got away with it.

The Chashma reprocessing plant  provoked  much controversy , both in Pakistan  and abroad.  Critics  at home  questioned the utility  of the reprocessing  facility  for the nuclear weapons program , as it was under the full scope IAEA safeguards, while others  outside Pakistan  expressed  doubts  about the efficacy of those very same safeguards. Another  contentious  issue was that the 137 MW KANUPP , also under  IAEA safeguards, was the only source  of irradiated of spent  nuclear fuel  for Chashma reprocessing. This point raised the question of whether , should the reprocessing plant  be acquired , the PAEC  would then violate international safeguards on KANUPP  and divert the spent fuel  for reprocessing at Chashma.

Theoretically , this scenario  was possible  . KANNUP ‘s spent fuel , if and when reprocessed , could yield  enough plutonium  for a few weapons.  According  to a 1978 CIA analysis , KANUPP  could produce between 132 and 264 pounds of reactor grade  or weapon-grade  plutonium, depending  on how the reactor was optimized  for operation. ²⁷   But IAEA safeguard was far too stringent  , making diversion  extremely  difficult.

Ultimately , Pakistan’s plans to acquire plutonium  took another path. PAEC planned to indigenously build a 50-70 MW NRX –type reactor, which would be outside the scope of any safeguards, but the project was shelved  because of a shortage  of labor  and finances. 

New Labs: Indigenous Plutonium Extraction: As negotiations  with France continued  for the commercial  reprocessing  plant, the PAEC secretly commenced work on a  pilot-scale  reprocessing  facility.  This plant was one—tenth the size  of the Chashma plant and once completed , would produce  enough weapon grade  plutonium  for one  to three bombs  per year. ²⁸ Located  near PINSTECH , this small plant was known as “ New Labs.” ²⁹

The primary objective of New Labs was to train PAEC scientists  and engineers  in the sensitive  field of reprocessing . The same trained  personnel  could then be hired  to work  on the larger  commercial reprocessing plant  being built in Chashma . Upon completion , New Labs  had the capacity to reprocess 10-20 kg of spent reactor fuel  annually , and the plutonium  obtained  was sufficient  for at least  two to four atomic bombs each year.

NUCLEAR WALTZING: BHUTTO AND KISSINGER: Within three months  of India’s nuclear tests, President Richard Nixon  resigned. Pakistan had truly lost a friend. At this time , the Pakistani economy was in dire straits  following a poor wheat crop . Bhutto was  requesting  food aid  while simultaneously expanding the nuclear program ---seemingly unconscious  that he was delivering  on his  promise of eating grass. It was under such circumstances  that Bhutto and Kissinger entered  into a verbal banter  over Pakistan’s nuclear program. Given Pakistan ‘s difficult  position,  Bhutto approached  the Ford administration  for only two things ---economic  assistance , particularly  food aid , and an end  to arms’ embargo. He made  various indications  to the United States  that if  Pakistan’s  conventional forces  were bolstered , nuclear weapons  might not be necessary.

In February 1975, Bhutto visited Washington , just at the time  when concerns were rising  over Pakistani  nuclear capabilities , particularly  the purchase  of reprocessing fuel. The prime minister was successful and on February 24, Capitol Hill officially removed the arms embargo that had been imposed  on Pakistan  for the past ten years. U.S officials  were no less concerned  about Pakistan’s  purchase  plans  for the French reprocessing plant , which, in their assessment , was far too large  for the fuel requirements  of KANUPP . They quickly concluded that the plant’s  ultimate  purpose was none other  than to supply  the fuel  for a plutonium  weapons program. By the beginning of 1976, the nonproliferation  regime  had begun  to tighten  its export controls because Pakistan as well as other countries , were all engaged in troubling nuclear activities. Leading the way , the United States  embarked  on “ muscular diplomacy”  to derail  suspect programs. ³⁰ In February 1976 Kissinger met Bhutto in New York and suggested  that Pakistan ‘s needs  would be addressed  through alternative means , such as the creation  of an international  fuel processing  facility in Iran.  Needless to say the meeting was deadlocked.

In another attempt  to dissuade  Pakistan  from its nuclear path , Kissinger visited Pakistan  in August 1976. At the same time, U.S. elections were sparking debates , and Democrat Jimmy Carter’s  agenda  specifically  targeted  Kissinger  and his relaxed response  to India’s  nuclear test. Kissinger second trip  to Pakistan was an attempt to remedy his mistakes . He arrived with an offer of 110 A-7 attack bombers  for the Pakistan Air Force in exchange for cancelling the reprocessing plant purchase ; indicating  that Congress would most likely  approve such a deal. And as a stick , he brandished a possible  Democratic victory , hinting that when in power , Carter  would certainly  make an example  of Pakistan. ³¹ Since that meeting , the popular  myth  in Pakistan  has been that  Kissinger  threatened Bhutto  with “ a horrible example” , meant as an ultimatum. Later that year , Jimmy carter  won the U.S. presidential  election , just as Bhutto announced  a Pakistani election  to be held in March 1977.  Upon assuming  the presidency , Carter quickly turned down the Pentagon’s recommendation  to sell the A-7 attack  bombes to Pakistan > In response , Bhutto threatened  to quit CENTO  , claiming  that it discriminated  against Pakistan. Pakistan  did  indeed  leave the treaty  in 1979 and joined the NAM.

But the Pakistani prime minister had to focus  on his domestic  situation , as large protests  against  him began to spread that accused  him  of rigging  the elections. The domestic situation  in Pakistan  continued to deteriorate . Bhutto truly suspected  that the U.S.  had funneled  money to his Islamic opponents , who then  spurred  the protests. Restless, the Pakistani military  led by Zia-ul-Haq  overthrew Bhutto on July 5,1977.  From that day onward U.S.—Pakistani relations  rapidly deteriorated.  

Pakistan was not the only country  in the region  with political upheavals. In India , Mrs. Gandhi’s government  lost the Indian election , and for the first time  in the country’s history,  a new political part , the Janata  Party, came to power. In Iran, trouble was alo brewing  against the shah , who would eventually be overthrown  in 1979. And in Afghanistan  , the Daoud  regime  would face  domestic , tensions that eventually led to the end  of his reign in 1978.

Three months after Zia  took power  in Pakistan , in September 1977, State Department  nuclear specialist  Joseph Nye , Jr. , visited Islamabad  and threatened to cut off economic assistance  if the French  reprocessing plant  purchase succeeded. At that time , Pakistan was receiving  only US$50 million in aid annually, so the new leader had no incentive to agree  and clearly  informed  Nye  that he intended to proceed  with the project.  In response , U.S. nuclear  sanctions  were applied  and only food aid continued. This point was the lowest in the U.S.- Pakistani history.

Around this time , unbeknownst to the United States  as well as the Pakistani  public , Pakistan’s  nuclear elite embarked  on the highly enriched uranium  route to nuclear weapons.  

Dr. I.R. Durrani

P.S. The references embedded in the text will be provided later.

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